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CYBERSECURITY OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN THE
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR: AN EXAMINATION OF REGULATORY
AND PRIVATE LAW APPROACHES WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
NEEDED REFORMS
Jeanne C. Suchodolski, JD, LLM
The past twenty-five years gave rise to increasing levels of
automation within the transportation sector. From initial
subsystems, like vessel satellite tracking and automobile chassis
control, automation continues apace. The future promises fully
autonomous devices such as unmanned aerial systems (“UAS”) and
self-driving cars (“UAV”). These autonomous and automatic
systems and devices (“AASD”) provide safety, efficiency, and
productivity benefits. Yet AASD operate under continual threat of
cyber-attack.
Compromised AASD can produce dire consequences in the
transportation sector. The possible consequences extend far beyond
financial harms to severe bodily injury or even death. Given both
the prevalence of cyber threats and their potentially deadly
consequences, the public holds a legitimate interest in ensuring that
incentives exist to address the cybersecurity of such systems.
This paper examines both the private and public law
mechanisms for influencing AASD cybersecurity behaviors in the
transportation sector; and undertakes the first comprehensive
comparison of existing agency regulatory schemes. The findings
presented herein propose: (1) additional legislation to promote
sharing of cyber event data; and (2) transportation sector
regulatory best practices that require mandatory submission and
review of cybersecurity plans by OEMs and service providers when
compromise of their products or services threatens safety of life or
critical infrastructure. None of the recommendations advanced
herein require regulators to direct the adoption of any specific
technical solution or specific cybersecurity standard. Thus, industry
participants can remain nimble in the face of evolving cyber threats,
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while ensuring public safety through what proves to be needed
regulatory oversight.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, stated
in recent testimony before Congress that the United States public
and private sectors are at continual risk of cyber-attack from both
nation state and non-nation state actors.1 Coats stressed that the
threats “will increase in the next year and beyond as billions more
digital devices are connected—with relatively little built-in
security . . . .”2 Emerging technologies and novel applications of
available technologies have the potential to threaten the nation’s
infrastructure, including the transportation sector.3
The past twenty-five years ushered in ever-increasing levels of
automation within the transportation sector. From initial
applications like ship and aircraft systems monitoring, to automobile
traction control; automation continues apace. Current automatic
systems now include more complex capabilities such as the ability
to parallel park semi-autonomously.4 Future systems promise fully
autonomous unmanned aerial systems (“UAS”) and self-driving
cars. These automated and autonomous systems and devices
(“AASD”) have the potential to significantly improve safety while
providing benefits in efficiency and productivity. Yet, compromised
AASD can produce dire consequences in the transportation sector.
1

Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 16–17 (2018) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director
of National Intelligence), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG115shrg28947/pdf/CHRG-115shrg28947.pdf.
2
Id. at 16.
3
Id. at 23.
4
Aaron Turpen, How self-parking car technology works: the first step to
autonomous vehicles, NEW ATLAS (Nov. 29, 2016), https://newatlas.com/howself-parking-works/46684/.
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These consequences extend far beyond financial harms to severe
bodily injury or even death. Given both the prevalence of cyber
threats and their potential safety of life consequences, the public has
a legitimate interest in ensuring that the legal system includes
mechanisms that address AASD cybersecurity.
According to a report by the Congressional Research Service,
there are more than 50 federal laws relating to cybersecurity.5 By the
government’s own admission, no overarching structural framework
or organizing principles exist to unify this preponderance of
legislation into a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity.6 The
majority of existing legislation seeks to secure the administrative
systems, intelligence gathering, and defense capabilities of the
United States. An additional subset of federal law delegates to
specialized agencies, either directly or through broader more
comprehensive mandates, the responsibility for oversight of nonfederal critical infrastructure as well as for other non-federal sectorspecific activities.

5

ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES, CURRENT LAWS, AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 2–3 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf;
CALEB WATNEY & CYRIL DRAFFIN, R STREET POLICY NO. 118, ADDRESSING
NEW CHALLENGES IN AUTOMOTIVE CYBERSECURITY 7
(2017),
https://www.bafuture.org/sites/default/files/key-topics/attachments/
Addressing%20Automotive%20Cybersecurity%20Nov%202017.pdf.
6
FISHER, supra note 5, at 2.
TO
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Figure 1: A Simplified Diagram Illustrating Agency
Responsibilities for Regulating Cybersecurity

Figure 1 contains a simplified depiction of federal agency
cybersecurity responsibilities, created by the Congressional
Research Service.7 As seen in the Figure, under current law all
federal agencies have responsibility for securing their own systems.
In the private sector, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
serves as the primary civil-sector cybersecurity agency. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) develops
cybersecurity standards and guidelines, while sub-agencies within
the Department of Transportation and DHS retain responsibility for
their sector-specific regulatory charges. In addition, the White
House, through Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, can
and does instruct federal agencies on specific cybersecurity actions
and launches other cybersecurity improvements and initiatives.
In view of the escalating frequency and severity of cybersecurity
breaches, and the cumbersome and disordered array of federal
regulations designed to deal with them, many have called for
legislative reform and additional regulatory oversight of the private
7

Id. at 4.
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sector.8 Others argue that any such additional legislation and
regulation is not only unnecessary, but likely to stifle innovation,
introduce expensive and unnecessary overhead, and hinder access to
beneficial goods and services.9 Furthermore, logic suggests that
regulatory intervention need not be necessary if private legal
incentives for the desired cybersecurity behaviors already exist.
In at least one sector, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (“NHTSA”) and its constituency has allied itself
with the latter view, eschewing formal regulation of the cyber risks
inherent with autonomous vehicles and espousing, instead, the use
of optional industry guidelines.10 Other agencies, such as the U.S.
Coast Guard, adopt a slightly more aggressive posture: mandating
certain cybersecurity related actions, while not specifying in detail
the exact composition of those actions.11
This paper examines private and public law mechanisms to
encourage AASD cybersecurity in the transportation sector. The
analysis of private law mechanisms investigates the effectiveness of
contractual agreements, insurance products, and product liability
laws in influencing cybersecurity behaviors. The analysis of public
law focuses primarily on regulations. Regulations are the tactical
implementation of the broader statutory authority from which they
derive and define the specific, detailed actions AASD providers and
users must take. Furthermore, as illustrated by the NHTSA, statutory
authority to regulate does not necessarily lead to the promulgation
of regulations.

8

See id. at 4–7.
See, e.g., WATNEY & DRAFFIN, supra note 5, at 11.
10
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT
HS 812 442, AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 2.0: A VISION FOR SAFETY 1 (2017),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069aads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf.
11
See Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 05-17; Guidelines for
Addressing Cyber Risks at Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)
Regulated Facilities, 82 Fed. Reg. 32189 (proposed Jul. 12, 2017). See generally
33 C.F.R. pt. 105.
9
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF AASD AND THEIR USE IN THE
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR
AASD may comprise an entire vehicle, or a self-contained
component or subsystem thereof. The degree of automation within
AASD spans a wide range. At their least complex, AASD involve
the simple automatic monitoring of a component or subsystem: for
example, the tire pressure sensor and its companion alert system on
a car. At their most complex, AASD include completely
autonomous operations like self-driving cars. Between these two
extremes lies automatic and autonomous systems such as flight
management computers, ships’ autopilots, and the vehicle chassis
control used to manage road handling. The principal distinctions
between an automatic system and an autonomous system are the
degree of complexity and the impact on the overall operation and
conduct of the apparatus of which it forms a part. For purposes of
this paper, an automatic system, subsystem, component, or device is
one capable of operating without external control or intervention
(e.g. a tire pressure warning light), while an autonomous system is
self-governing with logic that enables decision making independent
of human intervention (e.g. an unmanned aircraft that delivers
packages to your doorstep).12 The consequences of a cyberattack
depends in part upon the degree of automation as well as the
function of the device or system automated.
AASD may be pre-programmed and exist independently of any
external communications network. In contemporary applications,
such configurations are becoming less and less common. The logic
incorporated into AASD is often queried for stored information or
periodically connected to external devices for the purposes of
12

See generally SOC’Y OF AUTO. ENG’RS INT’L, J3016 201806, SURFACE
VEHICLE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS
RELATED TO DRIVING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS FOR ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES 2
(2018) (describing six levels of motor vehicle automation, ranging from no
automation (level 0) to full driving automation (level 5)). While the cited source
is in the specific context of motor vehicles, the definition provided above in the
text is applicable to all devices and operations. For purposes of this paper it is only
necessary to understand that the degree and complexity of automation may vary
and that a distinction exists between an autonomous device and an automatic
function.
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performing updates and installing software patches. In the
transportation sector, AASD also frequently receive inputs needed
for their operation via communications links.

Figure 1: AASD Network Architecture

Figure 2 shows a top-level network architecture for connected
AASD consisting of three segments: an end-user segment, a
communications segment, and a control segment. The end-user
segment includes automobiles, trucks, airplanes, ships, and the
people who operate them. More specifically, the end-user segment
includes a network node with equipment that transmits, receives,
processes, and stores system data for use by the AASD or a human
end user.
The communications segment, which may be comprised of a
satellite communications network, a terrestrial wireless network, or
a combination thereof, routes data and information to and from a
data source or control facility and the AASD. When the
communications segment includes satellite-based navigation, data,
or communications services, the communications segment also
includes space-based communications nodes. These space-based
communications nodes comprise the satellite constellation and the
onboard payload(s) that transmit and route data and information
traffic. When the AASD communications segment includes a
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cellular wireless communications network, the communications
segment nodes comprise wireless cell towers, hotspots, or other
wireless cellular equipment.
The third and final AASD network segment, the control
segment, combines several functions distinct from the AASD enduser or the communications backbone itself. The control segment
includes any terrestrial data source that supplies information to the
AASD via the communications segment. The control segment also
includes any terrestrial facility that monitors network configuration,
bandwidth, power, and antennae as necessary to comply with the
service objectives and licensing obligations of the satellite or
cellular network. Some AASD applications, for example an
autonomous vehicle, also employ a staffed control center to actively
monitor AASD system performance. In critical situations, the
control center can directly intervene in AASD operations or render
assistance as appropriate.13 In more common, less urgent situations,
the control center collects information about any observed
performance aberrations or software vulnerabilities and provides
software updates to the end user segment.14
Whether AASD exist as discrete items or within a larger
connected network, their componentry, operation, and
communications backbones are all subject to cyber-attack. For ease
of discussion, these attack vulnerabilities can be aggregated and
summarized as follows:
a) Disruption or suppression of the radio frequency signals
transmitted between AASD network nodes,
b) Compromising the integrity of the information conveyed
between AASD nodes by altering the content, embedding content,
or intercepting content, and
c) Compromising the internal operation of equipment such as,
for example, data storage and retrieval tasks, or the communications
functions executed at an AASD node.
Ironically, the increasing sophistication of AASD leave them
even more susceptible to these attack vectors and exacerbates the
13
14

WATNEY & DRAFFIN, supra note 5, at 2–4.
Id.
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resulting consequences. Inclusion of a greater number of machineto-machine communications, interconnectivity, and autonomous
operations reduces human oversight. As a result, unauthorized
intrusions become more difficult to detect, and response
interventions more difficult to effect than in previous designs. The
growing proliferation of AASD also provides ever more access
points through which harm can be wreaked.
Providers of AASD must now also manage the quality and
security of constituent items provided by multi-national sources via
a global logistics chain. Shared service models and the outsourcing
of key operations add to the complex and interlocking nature of the
modern supply chain. Numerous parties thus contribute to the design
and operation of modern-day AASD. As the number of participants
in AASD logistic chains grow, so too do the system vulnerabilities.15
Recent documented incidents leave no doubt that these
vulnerabilities exist in reality and not as theoretical abstractions. A
study reported in the MIT Technology Review documented the
spoofing of shipboard Automatic Identification Systems (“AIS”) to
make fake vessels appear, real ships disappear, and to issue false
emergency alerts.16 An August 2017 report by BBC News
documented numerous attacks on shipboard systems, including one
where a hacker hacked into the satellite communications of a tanker
ship at sea.17 Although the hacker, a cybersecurity researcher, did no
damage, the opportunity existed to alter software in the
communications link, manipulate the ship’s position reporting, or
infect with malware the other shipboard systems connected to that
network.18
15

See DAVID LIVINGSTONE & PATRICIA LEWIS, SPACE, THE FINAL FRONTIER
CYBERSECURITY? 13–15 (2016), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites
/default/files/publications/research/2016-09-22-space-final-frontiercybersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf.
16
Tom Simonite, Ship Tracking Hack Makes Tankers Vanish from View, MIT
TECH. REV. (Oct. 18, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520421/shiptracking-hack-makes-tankers-vanish-from-view/.
17
Chris Baraniuk, How Hackers are Targeting the Shipping Industry, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40685821.
18
Id.
FOR
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Cybersecurity incidents are not just limited to the maritime
industry. In October of 2014, the weather satellite network of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration suffered a
disruption in service mere months after the OIG issued a report
outlining the agency’s vulnerability to attack.19 At the 2017
CyberSat Summit in Tysons Corner, Virginia, experts from the
Department of Homeland Security admitted they wirelessly hacked
into the Department’s own Boeing 757 aircraft while it sat on a
tarmac.20 A recent article by JC Reindl of the Detroit Free Press
summarized the history of automobile cyber-hacks and admonished
readers via the headline: “Car hacking remains a very real threat as
autos become ever more loaded with tech.”21
AASD are thus becoming increasingly embedded in the global
infrastructure, actual attacks are occurring, and evolving system
attributes are making cyber threats more likely. Yet, market forces
and technological advancements are discouraging, rather than
encouraging, the rigorous confrontation of these threats. The rapid
pace of innovation makes certain markets highly competitive. In
those markets, providers must constantly innovate and provide new
19

NOAA Confirms Cyberattack ‘in Recent Weeks,’ NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2014,
8:28 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/noaa-confirms-cyberattackrecent-weeks-n247446. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
COM., OIG-14-025-A, SIGNIFICANT SECURITY DEFICIENCIES IN NOAA’S
INFORMATION SYSTEMS CREATE RISKS IN ITS NATIONAL CRITICAL MISSION
(2014), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-14-025-A.pdf; OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OIG-16-043-A, SUCCESSFUL
CYBER ATTACK HIGHLIGHTS LONGSTANDING DEFICIENCIES IN NOAA’S IT
SECURITY PROGRAM (2016), https://www.oig.doc.gov/ OIGPublications/OIG-16043-A.pdf (finding that systems were vulnerable to attack because the weakness
identified in the previous report had not been addressed, and also evaluating the
agency’s subsequent response to the attack).
20
Calvin Biesecker, Boeing 757 Testing Shows Airplanes Vulnerable to
Hacking,
DHS
Says,
AVIONICS
INT’L
(Nov.
8,
2017),
http://www.aviationtoday.com/2017/11/08/boeing-757-testing-shows-airplanesvulnerable-hacking-dhs-says/.
21
JC Reindl, Car hacking remains a very real threat as autos become ever more
loaded with tech, USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2018, 1:56 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/01/14/car-hacking-remains-veryreal-threat-autos-become-ever-more-loaded-tech/1032951001/.
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offerings to remain viable.22 The imposition of additional design
requirements to address cybersecurity issues can retard the
deployment of new capabilities and the exploitation of first-tomarket opportunities.23
For these reasons, the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) argues that the communications industry’s cybersecurity
practices fall short due to market failures.24 In a report dated January
17, 2017, and issued prior to the current administration, the FCC
cited evidence of three distinct types of market failures contributing
to underinvestment in internet cybersecurity.25 The first of these
failures notes that imperfect information exists among network
operators and system users. Network operators often lack
information about attacks experienced by others and the
effectiveness of deployed solutions in responding to those attacks.26
The second notes that investment in cybersecurity practices varies
as a function of market power. Markets with minimal competition
leave consumers with little choice but to purchase services from a
given provider regardless of the level of cyber-threat protection. 27
Conversely, as noted above, robust competition may penalize those
who invest time and resources into cybersecurity by delaying
introduction of their offerings into fast-moving markets. Finally, the
FCC notes that cybersecurity best practices have both positive and
negative externalities that disincentivize both service providers and
end users from engaging in optimal levels of cyber countermeasures
and behaviors.28 The burgeoning Internet of Things (“IoT”) and
autonomous systems markets only exacerbate this investment
shortfall as the negative externalities imposed upon third parties by

22

See LIVINGSTONE & LEWIS, supra note 15, at 12.
Id.
24
DAVID SIMPSON, PUB. SAFETY & HOMELAND SEC. BUREAU, FCC,
CYBERSECURITY RISK REDUCTION 40–51 (2017), https://insidecybersecurity
.com/sites/insidecybersecurity.com/files/documents/jan2017/cs2017_0017.pdf.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
23
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cyber events provide little incentive for providers to avoid them.29
While the FCC study focused specifically on the communications
industry, the market failure issues and concerns raised therein are
equally applicable to the larger AASD context.
Nonetheless, most transportation and communications industry
segments do not believe dealing with cybersecurity threats requires
additional legislation or regulation.30 Industry participants argue
many of the cybersecurity risks inherent in AASD can be mitigated
via thoughtful engineering and design, personnel and vendor
policies, and operations protocols as a matter of best practice. A
significant subset of AASD providers additionally point to the dualuse nature of their product and service offerings. As suppliers to the
federal government, these providers must satisfy the government’s
stringent security requirements, and therefore security in the private
sector benefits without needing to impose additional oversight.31
The need for some sort of effective incentive to maintain cybervigilance and thwart attacks is of even greater importance in the
transportation sector than in other portions of the economy. Unlike
hacking of credit cards, personal information, or other data breaches,
hacks of AASD can inflict bodily harm—even fatalities. The harms
that can result from AASD breaches in the transportation sector thus
are not limited to the financial. The systems on which AASD are
29

Id. See Eli Dourado & Jerry Brito, Is There a Market Failure In
Cybersecurity?,
MERCATUS:
TECH.
POL’Y
(Mar.
6,
2012),
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/there-market-failure-cybersecurity, for a
discussion of market failures and externalities in the cybersecurity context.
30
See,
e.g.,
Cybersecurity,
TELECOMM.
INDUS.
ASSOC.,
https://www.tiaonline.org/what-we-do/advocacy/policy-issues/cybersecurity/
(last visited Sept. 4, 2018) (stating that “[r]igid regulatory requirements cannot
keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies and threats and require industry to
comply with obsolete security requirements rather than addressing real-time
threats, effectively making systems less secure”); see also Eric Kulisch,
Cybersecurity push may tie up autonomous-car legislation: Automakers, senators
at odds over best approach, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (June 24, 2017, 12:01 AM),
http://www.autonews.com/article/20170624/OEM11/170629894/cybersecurityautonomous-legislation-sen-markey (describing automakers’ resistance to
proposed cybersecurity legislation).
31
See Pete Roney, Chief Innovations Officer, Thales, Address at the
Economist’s A New Space Age Conference: The Data Race (Nov. 9, 2017).
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employed carry persons on highways, through the air, and on the
high seas. Their failure not only impacts these direct users but also
the third-party bystander crossing the street, or child playing in a
yard.32 Often, the conversations surrounding the need for
cybersecurity regulations trigger an all or nothing debate, and fail to
recognize the distinctions between the degrees of automation, the
severity of the consequences, and the resulting sliding scale of
damage. Depending on the severity of consequences and safety of
life considerations, different levels of regulatory oversight might be
warranted.
This paper explores how existing private law mechanisms and
public law mechanisms promote cybersecurity behaviors and
motivate transportation sector AASD providers and users to take
actions that reduce the risk and consequences of cyber-threats. More
specifically, this paper explores the effectiveness of the following
private law risk allocation mechanisms: contract law, insurance, and
product liability. The effectiveness of these private law mechanisms,
if sufficient, may obviate the need for formal regulation.
Conversely, if these private law measures are weak or relatively
ineffective at promoting cybersecurity behaviors, regulation is
warranted as a matter of public safety. This paper also surveys the
existing U.S. regulations that impact transportation sector
cybersecurity and evaluates the manner in which current regulations
promote the desired behaviors. From the entirety of this analysis, the
appropriateness of (and opportunities for) additional legislation or
private law solutions emerge.

32

See, e.g., Aarian Marshall & Alex Davies, Uber’s Self Driving Car Saw the
Woman It Killed, Report Says, WIRED (May 24, 2018, 3:38 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/uber-self-driving-crash-arizona-ntsb-report/
(describing the fatal collision of a self-driving car with a third-party pedestrian
walking a bicycle). Although this tragic accident did not result from a
cybersecurity breach, the event demonstrates that third parties are potential
victims when AASD malfunction or behave in unanticipated ways.
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III. PRIVATE LAW MECHANISMS FOR INFLUENCING
AASD CYBERSECURITY
Private law mechanisms that encourage manufacturers and
service providers to undertake cybersecurity behaviors include:
(a) Contractual agreements,
(b) Use of Cover, and
(c) Tort law via product liability.
The sub-sections below examine each in turn.
A. Contractual Agreements
Parties procuring or supplying AASD will always do so under
some sort of written agreement that allocates the risk of
cybersecurity events amongst the contracting parties. In two of the
three markets considered, marine and aviation, a large mass market
does not exist, making it difficult to examine a sample agreement or
ascertain the relative bargaining strength of the supplier and
consumer of services. Both parties to this type of transaction are
likely to be highly sophisticated; and the manner in which AASD
are operated and procured likely puts both parties in a position to
efficiently mitigate certain types of potential harms. For example, a
ship owner may be in the best position to reduce the risks stemming
from any compromise of shipboard earth stations by adopting
prudent watch standing practices, while the service provider is in the
best position to mitigate the risks associated with data corruption by
patching known software vulnerabilities.
However, in typical contracting terms, the AASD provider
usually disclaims all financial harms such as incidental and
consequential damages, as well as disclaiming all warranties.33
Typical terms also severely limit the ability to recover damages.34
Only with extreme difficulty or significant bargaining power will
even a sophisticated purchaser of AASD be able to substantially
revise such provisions. Thus, sales and support agreements are
33

See MICHAEL OVERLY & JAMES KALYVAS, SOFTWARE AGREEMENTS LINE
(Aspatore Books 2004).
34
See id. at 63 (highlighting that most commercial software licenses limit
recovery “to all or some portion of the fees paid for the software”).
BY LINE 51–66
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unlikely to influence the cybersecurity of AASD design or operation
beyond that minimally necessary for the seller to exist in the
marketplace.
In the third market segment, automotive, the contracting power
resides almost exclusively with the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (“OEM”).35 Neither suppliers nor end-users hold
much sway over the allocation of risks in the subject agreements.
Purchasers of automotive vehicles take the vehicle subject to the
OEM’s software license terms, or the pass-through licenses of the
OEM’s supplier, with no opportunity to negotiate on matters other
than the vehicle price. Suppliers wish to access the lucrative
aftermarket for spare parts and additional services that stem from
being included in the OEM’s vehicle offering.36 In exchange for this
advantageous market position, suppliers typically offer little
resistance to the OEM’s supplier agreements.37 These OEM
agreements generally seek to avoid both the costs of undertaking
cybersecurity measures and the liabilities for any resulting harms,
although there is evidence that some information technology
suppliers have been able to negotiate these terms.38 Nonetheless,
35

A company that produces a product from component parts supplied by others.
For example, an automobile manufacturer or airplane manufacturer.
36
Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in
Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 958, 981–982 (2006). While
Ben-Shahar and White focused on Tier 1 suppliers, defined as “anyone who sells
directly to an OEM,” to the auto industry, id. at 955, they noted that the OEM’s
admit to using rigid boilerplate forms drafted in “a one-sided, self-serving
manner.” Id. at 981. The authors additionally note that suppliers will often invest
significant sums for tooling and production in hopes that they will be able to
support continued production and supply of service parts for the lifecycle of the
vehicle. See id. at 963; see also OEM Supplier Relations and Deregulation, JETTEK,
https://jet-tek.com/aerospace-industry-direction/oem-supplier-relationsderegulation/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018) (describing similar behaviors in the
aerospace sector and noting that suppliers are willing to absorb significant
investment costs to secure a position in the production supply chain and access to
aftermarket revenue streams).
37
Ben-Shahar & White, supra note at 36, at 981–82 (noting suppliers are often
“captives” of the OEMs).
38
Id. at 960–61, n.31 (noting that OEMs draft broad indemnity terms obligating
suppliers to reimburse and defend the OEM against product liability claims).
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contracting terms are still likely to be very favorable to the OEM
and provide few contract incentives for the OEM to undertake
cybersecurity measures on their own.39 In those cases where an
information technology provider has negotiated to provide a cap on
liability or warranty claims, such terms limit the supplier’s financial
risk. Reason suggests that such provisions may also dampen the
supplier’s incentive to aggressively work cybersecurity issues
generally as well as those specifically arising from the OEM’s use
case.
Additionally, in all transportation sectors, certain types of harm,
including significant physical harms, may in fact be borne by third
parties not a party to any AASD agreement. A seaman injured when
his ship runs aground due to corrupted navigation data will not likely
benefit from the damages and liability provisions contained within
the shipping line’s AASD contract. AASD contracts allocate the
risks of financial harms, including third party financial liability,
between the contracting parties.40 Yet, the AASD agreement likely
does nothing to allocate risks between third parties and the AASD
suppliers or users, since those third parties do not exist as a party or
intended beneficiary to the agreement.
B. Insurance
Parties providing and procuring AASD may wish to procure
cover to ameliorate the losses suffered from cyber-threat events.
Cover is most commonly obtained as an insurance product, but
cover to protect against losses can also be attained via other financial
instruments such as a bond, or maintenance of a cash reserve.41
However, Ben-Shahar & White also note that IT suppliers can sometimes secure
more favorable terms that limit warranties and cap remedies at repair and
replacement. Id. at 978.
39
Id. at 960 (alleging that the OEM’s one-sided contract terms are economically
inefficient because the OEM has little incentive to avoid or address product
quality issues directly; and further noting that the OEMs with the most selfserving contract language take the longest to identify and resolve a defect).
40
See, e.g., OVERLY & KALYVAS, supra note 33, at 51–66.
41
See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. § 540.24 (2018) (describing various types of financial
vehicles available to operators of passenger vessels as proof of adequate financial
responsibility for liabilities arising from death or injury to passengers).
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When cover is procured via an insurance product, the underwriter
would theoretically be incentivized to reward those behaviors that
mitigate cyber-threats and reduce the probability of paying out a
claim. Both aviation and maritime insurance contracts, however,
specifically exclude cyber event coverage via standard pro-forma
clauses.42 The absence of insurance as a readily available form of
cover means fewer financial resources exist to pay out claims made
by third parties who suffer damage as a consequence of cyberthreats.
In the automotive industry, insurance providers appear to have a
more progressive outlook, and appear to be prepping for the arrival
of autonomous cars.43 One study estimated that cybersecurity will be
the greatest driver of premiums in the auto insurance segment,
42

KATHERINE B. POSNER, TIM MARLAND & PHILIP CHRYSTAL, MARGO ON
AVIATION INSURANCE APPENDIX: AVIATION POLICY FORMS, CLAUSES AND
ENDORSEMENTS STANDARD CLAUSE AVN 48 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2016)
(specifically excluding from coverage claims caused by “any malicious act or act
of sabotage,” however, none of the standard clauses or exclusions specifically
mention cyber-attacks.); see also LLYOD’S MARKET ASSOCIATION, CYBER RISKS
AND EXPOSURES: MODEL CLAUSES—CLASS OF BUSINESS REVIEW § 3 (Jan. 2018),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc
=s&source=web&cd=
1&ved=2ahUKEwiTlZHIr-HdAhXwITQIHXFzBCMQFjAAegQICRAC
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lmalloyds.com%2FAsiCommon%2FControls%2F
BSA%2FDownloader.aspx%3FiDocumentStorageKey%3Dc3910476-c5d447b1-bf3c-8b7e12e08299%26iFileTypeCode%3DPDF%26iFileName
%3DCyber%2520Clauses%2520Review&usg=AOvVaw0lFlryOCXotAHBalJdROA (noting that many aviation policies are “silent” regarding the coverage of
cybersecurity claims but include the standard exclusion for “ ‘malicous acts and
sabotage’ (which potentially comprises cyber-attacks)” and for which additional
coverage is available. The document additionally notes that clause CL380 is
widely used in the marine industry to exclude cyber-attack coverage); see also
Jonathon Saul & Carolyn Cohn, Insurance gaps leave shipping exposed to
growing cyber threats, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2017, 8:30 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shipping-insurance-cyberidUSKBN14W1EA (confirming the maritime industry general practice as
reported in the Margo text).
43
See Werner Rapberger, Markets Offering the Largest Cyber Security
Insurance Opportunity, ACCENTURE (Nov. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Rapberger,
Markets],
https://insuranceblog.accenture.com/markets-offering-the-largestcyber-security-insurance-opportunity.
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projecting a total of $64 billion by 2025.44 These automobile policies
anticipate underwriting coverage for ransomware, vehicle theft,
unauthorized entry, and identity theft.45 Of note, a review of these
policies as described in the available literature appear to address
only the economic harms suffered by the driver, and do not
underwrite bodily injury to the driver or others resulting from the
compromise of automotive AASD.
The availability and scope of policies to underwrite the
cybersecurity risks faced by OEMs and automotive AASD suppliers
also continues to evolve. As in the aviation and marine insurance
markets, such risks are disclaimed by standard policy provisions and
the ability to purchase riders expansive enough to cover risks
beyond data breaches appears quite limited.46 Although some
insurance products such as AIG’s CyberEdge offer a complete
corporate insurance product, which includes protection against third
party claims, the industry struggles to introduce new coverages.47
Underwriters cite the following problems in assessing risk: a lack of
data reporting actual events; and that the amount of data currently
available is insufficient to support the actuarial processes.48
Underwriters also live in fear that a single cyber hack or breach
could result in a cascading and catastrophic accumulation of

44

Id.
Id.
46
See Tony Chimino, 5 Types of Cyber Liabilities for Manufacturers, 18
INDUSTRY TODAY, no. 3, 2015, at 30–37, https://industrytoday.com/article/5types-of-cyber-liabilities-for-manufacturers/ (noting that general liability policies
now typically exclude cyber risks requiring the purchase of separate, additional
policies); Jayleen R. Heft, 7 Challenges Insurers Face in the Cyber Insurance
Market,
PROPERTYCASUALTY360
(Mar.
8,
2017,
7:01
PM),
https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2017/03/08/7-challenges-insurers-facein-the-cyber-insurance/?slreturn=20180805001533 (noting that cyber insurance
products are a “work in progress” and that existing products narrowly define the
risks underwritten and ignore many of the cyber risks companies actually face).
47
See Werner Rapberger, The New Shape of Cyber Security Insurance –
Meeting Evolving Threats Head On, ACCENTURE (Nov. 8, 2017) [hereinafter
Rapberger, New Shape], https://insuranceblog.accenture.com/the-new-shape-ofcyber-security-insurance-meeting-evolving-threats-head-on.
48
Id.
45
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claims.49 Given these uncertainties, cover for cyber-related risks is
usually comprised of non-standardized products that are not widely
available—at least at the moment. Furthermore, even when
available, studies note that only 50% of U.S. businesses obtain cyber
risk insurance to cover either their business or their products.50
Insurance therefore does not exist as a mechanism to promote
AASD cybersecurity because widespread underwriting of these
risks does not exist. Thus, the opportunity for insurers to exert
influence over AASD providers through counseling and oversight
of the insured is essentially nonexistent for the transportation sector.
C. Product Liability Tort Law
Beginning in the late 1800s, courts began holding manufacturers
and others liable for distributing defective products that cause
injury.51 The courts, and the later-enacted state product liability
laws, enabled the pursuit of such claims under theories of
negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty.52 Whether via
common law or legislation, products liability law seeks the
attainment of two public policy goals: (1) to compensate those
injured by unsafe products; and (2) to provide incentives for
manufacturers to take reasonable precautions in the design and
manufacture of their products.53 The later purpose recognizes that
manufacturers are often the parties with the best opportunity and
lowest cost to minimize or avoid any downstream harms resulting
from the intended use of their products.54
Criticism of product liability law notes that such laws may not
be necessary where consumers have both the information and the

49

Id.
Rapberger, Markets, supra note 43.
51
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
52
Id.
53
Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
1503, 1533–34 (2013), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/
nulr/vol107/iss4/1.
54
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. e, § 2 cmt. a.
50
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opportunity to select those products they deem safer than others.55
Manufacturers of safer products are therefore rewarded in the
marketplace with a greater number of sales. These supply and
demand market forces combine such that consumers purchase, and
manufacturers also provide safety benefits at an economically
efficient level.56
In the case of autonomous and automatic systems, however, the
end users of such products may not be aware of the information
needed to discriminate on this basis until after a potentially fatal
accident has occurred. In addition, by design, the operation of
autonomous and automatic systems is not transparent to even the
most sophisticated of users. The consumers of such systems likely
possess little practical information about how the system performs
and may not even be aware of a cyber breach until well after the
fact.57 These unique aspects of AASD leave the purchasers of such
systems with little opportunity to avoid the harms of cyber
malfeasance on their own, other than by installing patches supplied
by the manufacturer.58 As a practical matter, end users may also
possess little real marketplace choice if the entire industry
underspends on preventing cybersecurity risks.59 Therefore, holding

55

See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for
Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010), https://harvardlawreview.org/
2010/04/the-uneasy-case-for-product-liability/.
56
Id.
57
See, e.g., Steven Overly, What we know about car hacking, the CIA and those
WikiLeaks claims, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/03/08/what-we-know-about-car-hacking-thecia-and-those-wikileaks-claims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.596922bec42a
(quoting cybersecurity researcher Chris Valasek: “It doesn’t appear that any
manufacturers currently have detection/prevention methods for such attacks,” and
noting that experts such as University of Michigan researcher Sam Lauzon and
cybersecurity expert Yoni Heilbron believe it can be difficult to know when a
vehicle has been hacked); see also Steve Tengler, Top 10 Unspoken Automotive
Cybersecurity Risks, WARDSAUTO (Jul. 17, 2018), https://www.wardsauto.com/
industry-voices/top-10-unspoken-automotive-cybersecurity-risks.
58
Tengler, supra note 57.
59
See id. (noting the business and financial challenges in providing automotive
cybersecurity to consumers). See also Dourado & Brito, supra note 29, for a
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manufacturers of AASD accountable for the harms resulting from
insecure devices aligns with the public policy purpose of products
liability law by encouraging investment in security measures by the
party that can better assess the risk and more efficiently bear the
burden.
Yet, most commentators remain skeptical that product liability
principles can be successfully applied to insecure software and
equipment.60 The relative inability of private parties to allocate the
risks of cybersecurity via contract and warranty claims has been
noted previously above. Breach of warranty due to defective cybersecure design is likely to have been explicitly disclaimed.61
Imposing products liability for defective software, data, and
equipment via concepts of negligence or strict liability also remains
problematic.62 The core inquiry in such cases centers on whether the
harm resulted from a product defect caused by either: a deficiency
in the product’s design, its manufacture, or in warnings about its
inappropriate use.63 Software code prone to hacking has typically
been viewed as suffering from a design defect.64 Furthermore, the
possibility exists that firmware or chips containing malware
supplied via a manufacturer’s supply chain, or certain unanticipated
instabilities in code operation might be considered a manufacturing
defect to which strict liability attaches. Whatever the origin of the
alleged defect, applying the current legal tests used to establish
negligence in the design, or deficiencies in manufacture, pose
significant difficulties in the context of software and cybersecurity.65

general discussion of how market failures can contribute to underspending on
cybersecurity.
60
See generally Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure)
Things: Should Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused by Hacked
Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 913 (2017), https://repository.law.umich.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=mjlr.
61
OVERLY & KALYVAS, supra note 33, at 52.
62
Butler, supra note 60, at 915–16.
63
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
64
Butler, supra note 60, at 917.
65
Id.
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Two tests exist for establishing the existence of a design defect.
The first adopts a risk vs. utility test to determine if the foreseeable
harms could be avoided via adoption of a reasonable alternative
design. This test rapidly devolves into a highly technical argument
about whether the hack or resulting harm could have reasonably
been avoided if the code were reasonably rewritten in an alternative
manner.66 The second, a consumer expectations test, examines
whether the product performs safely when used as intended.67 This
second test, while more closely aligned with concepts of strict
liability, can pose difficulties in application when the product is
truly complex or poses obvious risks of use.68
A third source of products liability, the duty to warn, exists in
the jurisprudence of more than half the states and in the Third
Restatement of Torts.69 This legal test also balances the risks vs. the
burden of providing the warning. Courts are more likely to impose
this duty when an ongoing relationship exists with the customer
post-sale.70 In the context of AASD, such warnings might include
providing security patches, the supply of which serves to notify the
user of a cyber vulnerability.
Optionally, the duty to warn could conceivably include a blanket
warning that harm may result by not maintaining a vigilant watch
over the performance of the system even though automated. This
latter type of warning may be most effective in those transportation
applications where professional licensed personnel such as pilots
and ships’ masters remain ultimately responsible for the overall
vehicle operation. This type of warning may be ineffective or
unjustified in driverless cars where one benefit of the product is to
enable transportation for elderly or otherwise impaired drivers.
The duty to warn, even where it exists, may also give rise to
counterproductive outcomes. For example, actually providing a
security patch or a warning to operators about potential
consequences of hacked systems, may perversely serve as a means
66

Id.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 918.
70
Id.
67
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for manufacturers to avoid liability for design defects that might
have been avoided in the first place. Ultimately, the harm caused by
cyber breaches results from the bad acts of a third party. But, no one
today can claim that such acts are not foreseeable. And,
manufacturers remain the parties best able to take actions that
protect against these harms—exactly the type of behavior that
products liability law is designed to incentivize.
Yet, even if liability can be established under the existing
theories of product liability outlined above, there remains the issue
of quantifying and proving harm. As a general rule under the
Restatement of Torts and as adopted by several states, manufacturers
are not liable for the economic harm suffered from use of the
defective product.71 This limitation on recovery “has long been
viewed as an impediment to products liability” for defective
software and systems.72 In the transportation sector, such economic
harms might include, for example, improper navigation
performance that routes an aircraft or vehicle in such a manner that
it consumes additional fuel or causes a rippling effect of
transportation system delays; or an automobile rendered useless by
ransomware. Application of the economic loss doctrine would not
permit recovery of such pecuniary losses under the Restatement of
Torts, even if such harms resulted from an insecure, defectively
designed AASD.
Other types of losses, may however, be recoverable. In the
transportation sector, many foreseeable harms are not economic and
unfortunately include physical harm to tangible assets, such as an
automobile, a ship, or an aircraft; as well as bodily or emotional
harm to their occupants. Moreover, these same types of harm could
potentially be inflicted upon innocent bystanders. At present, the
law is unclear on whether these types of damages resulting from
cyber breaches of a defective product can be recovered, although
proposed changes to the Restatement favors recovery for damage to
tangible property or physical injury arising from insecure devices.73

71

Id. at 919.
Id. at 920.
73
Id. at 921.
72
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Product liability law as an incentive for hygienic cyber-security
behaviors thus holds much promise, but the state of its development
is immature. Not all types of harms suffered, even though potentially
significant, can be recovered. Additional limitations on the
effectiveness of product liability law arise not only from the
difficulty of proving defective design in this context, but in the
ability of manufacturers to use warnings and subsequent software
patches to avoid liability. This latter outcome may perversely result
in underinvestment in the initial cybersecurity design.
IV. PUBLIC LAW: CYBERSECURITY REGULATION OF
AASD
Given the difficulties faced by private law in encouraging and
achieving a desired level of cybersecurity behaviors, a reasonable
alternative lies in the promulgation of regulations via the public
sector. But, this approach also remains fraught with difficulties.
Cybersecurity regulation within the transportation sector exists as a
multitude of separate regulatory approaches by specialist executive
branch agencies with no overarching coherent federal approach, and
only limited inter-agency coordination.74
The sections below contain a detailed review of the current
transportation sector-specific regulations and those that bear upon
its cybersecurity. Regulations contain the detailed implementation
of the broader statutory authority from which they derive and define
the particular actions AASD providers, manufacturers, and users
must undertake. And, as noted previously above, agencies
sometimes refrain from promulgating cybersecurity regulations
even when they are statutorily enabled to do so. A survey of relevant
agency regulations therefore enables a comparison of the various
regulatory frameworks and identifies opportunities for reform.
More specifically, the sections below contain a detailed review
of the regulations promulgated by the following federal agencies.
The FCC Rules control the provision and use of the satellite
telecommunications systems and terrestrial wireless networks that
74

FISHER, supra note 5.
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form the communications backbone of a connected AASD.75 The
U.S. Coast Guard promulgates rules pertaining to maritime
operations.76 The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)
promulgates rules pertaining to aircraft operations, and the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration promulgates rules
pertaining to manufacture and sale of autonomous surface
vehicles.77 Potential utilization of remote sensing data by AASD
make the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) regulatory framework also of interest.78
A. Rules Applicable to All Connected AASD: FCC Regulations
The FCC regulations relevant to AASD address the
telecommunications components of the AASD communications
segment. As shown in Figure 2 above, many AASD connect to a
communications backbone for purposes of receiving and
transmitting data and control information. In most applications, the
communications segment connects to the internet or a dedicated
communications circuit via cellular wireless communications.
Increasingly, AASD communications segments include mobile
satellite services (“MSS”), especially in remote areas or over the
high seas. All MSS and wireless service providers must comply with
the licensing, technical, and operating regulations promulgated by
the FCC, regardless of the specific type or use of the mobile service.
The FCC regulations also implement and mandate compliance with
75

See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (describing the authority of the FCC to regulate
radio services generally).
76
14 U.S.C. § 2(3) (2018).
77
49 U.S.C. §§ 106, 40101 (2018) (establishing the FAA and defining its policy
objectives respectively); 14 C.F.R. ch. I (containing the aviation safety
regulations); 49 U.S.C. §§ 105, 30101 et seq. (providing the basis and framework
for the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration enforcement
authority over motor vehicles).
78
For example, satellite remote sensing data of fields and crops, coupled with
GPS data, can enable a farmer’s equipment to precisely modulate the amount of
fertilizer and water applied to locations within a field. See, e.g., P. C. Scharf, et
al., Remote Sensing for Nitrogen Management, 57 J. SOIL & WATER
CONSERVATION
518
(2002),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5513/
8b91a9fe6bf475541e374500d218cfe4724f.pdf.
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the ITU Radio Regulations and the radio provisions of all
international treaties to which the United States is a party.79 Thus, to
the extent FCC regulations and the ITU Radio Regulations mandate
cybersecurity protections, any requirements will be applicable to all
operators of AASD regardless of type.
1. FCC Regulation of MSS
The International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”),
classifies mobile satellite services (“MSS”) into five separate
subcategories of service: maritime mobile satellite service
(“MMSS”); land mobile satellite service (“LMSS”); aeronautical
mobile satellite service (“AMSS”); personal mobile satellite service
(PMSS); and broadcast mobile satellite service (“BCMSS”).80 Of
these broad categories, MMSS, LMSS, and AMSS are the most
relevant to implementation of AASD in the transportation sector.
The licensing provisions of 47 CFR Part 25 address the initial
licensing of MSS systems and apply separate criteria to the licensing
of space stations and earth stations.81 Appendices A-1 and A-2
contain tables summarizing the specific FCC licensing regulations
applicable to MSS. These regulations primarily operate to ensure
that equipment will transmit within the assigned frequency band
without harming others’ use of the radio spectrum. Additional
regulations address system ownership and restrict communications
with non-U.S. satellites.82 While the regulations reduce
cybersecurity threats by constraining the number of interfaces with
non-U.S. persons and systems, the purpose of these regulations is
not cybersecurity, but the oversight of market competition and
compliance with U.S. treaty commitments.

79

See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 80.86.
Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Radio Reg. art. 1.19–1.60, Section III – Radio
Services, in Volume 1 Radio Regulations: Articles, Chapter 1: Terminology and
Technical Characteristics, at 9–13 (2016).
81
47 C.F.R. § 25.
82
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 25.135, .137, .143, .149 (restricting communications with
non-U.S. satellite systems); 47 C.F.R. § 20.5 (documenting citizenship
requirements).
80

148

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 121

Other operational requirements applicable to all types of satellite
communications can be found in Subpart D of 47 CFR Part 25.
Certain of these general operating provisions are relevant to
cybersecurity best practices. For example, 47 CFR § 25.271 requires
operators of transmitting stations to stand watch at all times
whenever the station is transmitting.83 Transmitting facilities must
be protected against both unauthorized access and unauthorized
operations whenever an operator is not present at the station.84
Within the 1.5/1.6 GHz frequency bands, mobile earth stations must
include features that ensure the station accesses the communications
network subject to the frequency use priority rights of others.85
Mobile earth stations operating within these bands must also
transmit a unique terminal identification code upon any attempt to
access the network and must be configured to immediately inhibit
its transmissions upon receiving a channel shut off command or
upon loss of channel assignment and control information.86 These
requirements, while intended to preserve the frequency sharing
schemes between primary and secondary uses of the spectrum, do
afford some measure of protection should hackers attempt to initiate
unauthorized use of MSS earth stations because these requirements
either thwart unauthorized access or make unauthorized access
detectable.
Later chapters of the FCC regulations apply more specific Rules
to operation of MMSS, VMSS, and AMSS.87 The FCC requires
operators of all ship earth stations, and all aircraft earth stations to
be licensed and to display such license.88 Operator licenses are not
required for automobile receive-only earth stations. Although
certain licenses are granted automatically by rule, foreign

83

47 C.F.R. § 25.271.
47 C.F.R. § 25.271(d).
85
47 C.F.R. § 25.287.
86
Id.
87
See 47 C.F.R. pts. 80, 87, 90, for maritime, for aviation, and private land
mobile services respectively.
88
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 80.51, .13, for ships and 47 C.F.R. §§ 87.19, .103, for
aircraft.
84

OCT. 2018]Cybersecurity of Autonomous Systems in Transport

149

governments and their representatives cannot obtain earth station
licenses.89
Ships subject to the Communications Act or the Safety
Convention are also subject to annual inspection of their shipboard
communications equipment.90 Additional operating rules define
communications protocols to ensure that a single station does not
unduly monopolize the operating frequency.91 In the aviation
environment, the FCC places additional physical controls upon
operations of the transmitter. Specifically, 47 CFR § 87.143 states
that transmitters must be installed such that only authorized users
have access and airborne transmitters must be able to be switched
off by the operator.92
2. FCC Regulation of Mobile Radio Services
A review of the FCC’s wireless network ownership and operator
regulations reveals approaches and issues similar to those outlined
above in connection with MSS. As in the case of MSS, the FCC
requires a license to operate the service.93 Ownership of the wireless
network is only available to U.S. citizens and corporations
controlled by U.S. entities.94 Carriers having more than sixteen
employees must also file an annual employment report, but this
report merely documents the demographics and diversity of the
carriers’ personnel.95 The required employment report does not
reach matters of interest to cybersecurity such as vetting or
credentialing of those employees.96
89

See 47 C.F.R. §§ 80.13, .15, for ships and 47 C.F.R. § 87.19, for aircraft.
Note that alien persons and corporations cannot obtain an aircraft earth station
license because the regulations prohibit foreign governments, foreign persons, and
foreign corporations from holding station licenses.
90
47 C.F.R. § 80.59.
91
See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 80.141 (specifying shipboard radio communications
protocols and technologies to prevent an open or “hot” mike); 47 C.F.R. § 87.185
(specifying communications protocols for aircraft).
92
47 C.F.R. § 87.143.
93
47 C.F.R. § 22.107.
94
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 20.5, 310 (documenting citizenship requirements).
95
47 C.F.R. § 1.815; FCC Form 395.
96
Id.
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Additional Rules govern the technical performance of the
wireless network and its equipment. Wireless network terminals,
including end-user and intermediate communications nodes and
equipment, must satisfy technical requirements that prevent harm to
the public switched telephone network, and interference with others’
lawful use of spectrum.97 The FCC additionally requires certification
that the wireless communications equipment complies with these
technical conditions.98 The cell towers and their radio equipment
which form component parts of the wireless network are also
regulated by the FCC.99 Cellular radio facilities (i.e. radio
stations/towers) must be registered with the FCC and comply with
rigid technical specifications.100 Via these Rules, much like in MSS,
the FCC specifies the technical performance of the radio equipment
and antennae to ensure lawful use of the spectrum and that
transmissions do not interfere with others’ lawful use of the
airwaves. Much of the FCC’s remaining rule-making regarding
mobile services centers on tariffs, roaming, and spectrum
allocation.101
3. Other FCC Cybersecurity Policy and Guidance
The FCC maintains a Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau that encourages MSS and wireless service providers to
implement the security countermeasures developed by the agency’s
Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability
Council.102 This Council, composed of industry participants,
endeavors “to make recommendations to the [FCC] that promote the
97

See 47 C.F.R. § 20.15(a); 47 C.F.R. pt. 68.
See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 68.201 (requiring certification by either a
Telecommunications Certification Body or self-certification via a declaration of
conformity); 47 C.F.R. § 68.218 (requiring that the responsible party warrants
compliance with the applicable technical rules and regulations for interconnection
with the public switched network).
99
See 47 C.F.R. § 17.
100
See 47 C.F.R. § 17.5, 22.150.
101
See 47 C.F.R. pt. 20.
102
See, e.g., FCC, DA 17–799, FCC’S PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND
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security, reliability, and resiliency of the Nation’s communications
systems.”103 The Council currently convenes three Working Groups,
each Group focused on making recommendations regarding a single
narrow sub-topic related to the Council’s larger mission statement.
Working Group 3, “Network Reliability and Security Risk
Reduction,” is the only current Working Group with a mandate
specifically encompassing communications network cyber-security
issues.104 More specifically, the Working Group 3 identifies and
examines security risks to: wireless protocols, the design and
implementation of 5G networks, and IoT devices.105 While from
time to time, the Council, via this Working Group provides reports
to the FCC , for reasons discussed further below, the FCC merely
issues guidance that encourages, but does not require compliance
with the Group’s recommendations. Recently, for example, the FCC
issued a Public Notice encouraging communications service
providers to implement a recommended best practice to counter a
known exploitation of the carrier system signaling protocols used by
the network infrastructure.106 Since these best practices are just
suggestions by the FCC, compliance is entirely voluntary and not
enforced.
4. Summary and Analysis of FCC Cybersecurity Regulations
This review of the FCC Rules governing the MSS and cellular
networks that form the AASD communication backbone reveals that
the existing FCC Rules do not address cybersecurity directly.
Rather, the Rules primarily function to ensure that an operator’s
legitimate use of their own systems does not interfere with or
compromise the use of another’s communication system. As such, a
significant percentage of the Rules focus primarily on technical
configurations, antenna specifications, design tolerances, and
103
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operator protocols. Certain of the Rules, such as physical access
requirements and preventing open mikes, may have ancillary
positive impacts on cyber security although that outcome is not their
primary purpose.
Although the FCC Rules do not currently address cybersecurity
directly, under the previous administration, the FCC asserted that it
had the statutory authority to make these types of Rules if it desired
to do so.107 As of this writing, however, the FCC only exerts
oversight of cybersecurity behaviors during its review of potential
telecommunications merger partners.108 The agency explained its
lack of rulemaking in this area in its January 2017 position paper by
noting that additional study is needed before the Agency
promulgates cybersecurity regulations.109
In point of fact, legitimate questions exist about the FCC’s
previous claim that its statutory authority extends to oversight of
cybersecurity for cellular and satellite networks. More specifically,
FCC Commissioner Michael O’Rielly recently wrote that he
believes the FCC’s cyber authority to be “extremely limited.”110
O’Rielly criticized previous Chairman Wheeler and others for the
elastic interpretation of the FCC’s enabling statute advanced in the
2017 position paper: an interpretation that would justify
cybersecurity oversight of the communications infrastructure by the
FCC.111 Current FCC Commissioners do not agree on the agency’s
ability or inability to regulate cybersecurity matters. In recent
testimony before Congress, FCC Chair Pai stated the agency lacked
the authority to lead on cybersecurity.112 But later in the same
107
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hearing, FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel disagreed stating
that the agency had an existing duty as public servants to engage in
cybersecurity oversight and additional legislation was not needed.113
As a consequence of this ambiguity, Democrats in Congress want
new legislation to not only grant the FCC the necessary statutory
authority, but to explicitly instruct the agency to proactively issue
cybersecurity regulations for the communications networks it
oversees.114
In 2017, Representative Yvette Clark (D) of New York
introduced HR 1335, the Cybersecurity Responsibility Act of 2017.
The draft legislation directs the FCC to issue new rules to secure
communications networks from cyber risks.115 As of this writing,
September 2018 the bill has been introduced in the House and
referred to the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology
with no further action taken.116 Thus, the creation of additional
cybersecurity requirements for MSS and cellular networks remains
unlikely given both the current administration and the existing
statutory ambiguity.
Nonetheless, the FCC continues to proactively work with
industry groups to better understand market conditions, legal and
technical constraints, and cybersecurity best practices via the
Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council.
In 2015, the Council’s Working Group 4 collaborated with multiple
telecommunications industry segments to promote voluntary
compliance with the NIST cybersecurity risk framework.117
Rosenworcel, FCC Comm’r), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4744670/ fcccommissioners-disagree-authority-cybersecurity-problems.
113
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Working Group 4 also documented that telecommunications
providers found sharing of event and threat information to be a best
practice for cyber risk mitigation.118 Working Group 5 was therefore
subsequently tasked with developing recommendations to
encourage sharing of cybersecurity information amongst
telecommunications industry participants.119 Although Working
Group 5 identified several mechanisms currently utilized by
industry participants to share cyber threat information, several
barriers to actually sharing that information exist.120 Specifically,
companies expressed a reticence to share attack information with
regulators and each other for fear of liability, the imposition of
future regulation, or subsequent disclosure by competitors.121
Precedent for enabling companies to confidentially report cyberrelated incidents with liability protection exists. The Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) encourages private citizens and
entities to voluntarily report significant cybersecurity events and to
seek assistance in responding to those events.122 Per Presidential
Policy Directive PPD-41, to the extent allowed under federal law,
FINAL REPORT 4 (2015) [hereinafter COUNCIL IV, FINAL REPORT 4],
https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/csric4/
CSRIC_IV_WG4_Final_Report_031815.pdf.
118
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the Department endeavors to keep such information confidential and
not disclose it to others.123 Working Group 5 thus recognized that
DHS plays the lead role in coordinating the dissemination of cyber
threat information and recommended that the FCC refrain from
duplicating these efforts.124
Yet, the DHS cyber event reporting regime as currently executed
does not fully address the barriers to information sharing identified
by Working Group 5. The process implemented by the Presidential
Directive is distinct from and does not contain many of the statutory
protections found within the cyber event disclosure provisions of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. Section 214 of that Act provides a
mechanism for voluntarily disclosing cyber event information to
DHS, when such an event impacts “critical infrastructure and
protected systems.”125 Disclosures made under this statutory
provision prohibit disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act,
prevent the use of that information in regulatory enforcement, and
bar the information from use in any civil lawsuit.126 Since only
disclosures pertaining to critical infrastructure are covered under
this statute, not every voluntary disclosure of cyber events receives
the benefit of these statutory protections. MSS and cellular systems
do not typically fall within the critical infrastructure definition.
Hence, information voluntarily reported to the FCC or DHS about
cyber incidents involving those systems often do not enjoy the
protections of the Homeland Security Act, and must rely on the
much more limited protections afforded under PPD-41.
The proposed Cybersecurity Responsibility Act of 2017, HR
1335, would elevate communications networks generally, including
all types of satellite mobile communications networks, to “critical
infrastructure and protected systems” as that term is defined in
sections 2(4) and 212(6) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.127
Adoption of this measure resolves the reporting dilemmas raised by
mobile communications companies and their suppliers. Since the
123
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bill also includes provisions that would expand the FCC’s regulatory
authority, the bill is unlikely to pass.
B. Cybersecurity Regulation of AASD in the Maritime
Transportation Sector
On the high seas, ships employing AASD must utilize over-thehorizon communications services such as MSS as their AASD
communications backbone. Mobile satellite services for shipborne
uses have the longest history of operational deployment of all MSS
applications. These services thus also comprise the largest share of
the total MSS market.128 Most notable among maritime MSS service
providers is the industry’s first, Inmarsat.129 Created in 1979 as a
non-profit intergovernmental organization, Inmarsat’s original
mandate was to establish and operate a satellite communications
network for ocean vessels.130 Initially, the organization offered only
satellite radio-telephony services for safety of life at sea, but the
organization—since privatized—now offers many additional
services ranging from media entertainment and broadband internet
to ship security status and position tracking.131 The growing demand
for these maritime broadband products encouraged competitors to
offer their own similar suite of satellite services.132 Other mobile
satellite applications widely available in the marine sector include:
global satellite navigation, weather imagery, emergency locator
beacons, logistics and cargo management, internet connectivity, and
128
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satellite-based implementations of the Automatic Identification
System (“AIS”).
The AIS is an automatic tracking system used to broadcast ship
position information to other ships and to vessel traffic management
services. The AIS service thus plays a critical role in separating
marine traffic and avoiding collisions. U.S. regulations
implementing the International Maritime Organization Safety of
Life at Sea (“SOLAS”) requirements mandate AIS aboard all
passenger ships carrying more than 150 passengers, commercial
ships greater than 65 feet in length, certain commercial tugs and
fishing vessels, and vessels carrying dangerous cargo.133
Near shore, the AIS utilizes VHF134 line of sight radio
transmissions received directly by the vessel traffic management
ground stations as well as by the nearby ships.135 On the open ocean,
AIS line of sight VHF signals can no longer be received directly by
shore stations, but newer technologies enable companies such as
ORBCOMM,136 exactEarth,137 Spire,138 and Spacequest139 to offer
satellite-AIS services. Pending SOLAS mandates for long range
tracking, and their corresponding U.S. regulatory requirements

133
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ensure that these systems will become a universal safety and traffic
separation tool and an integral component of maritime AASD.140
A modern ship therefore includes numerous earth stations
connecting to multiple mobile satellite services. Some of these earth
stations provide critical safety functionality such as emergency
notifications and tracking. Others deliver satellite navigation and
weather data as an alternative source of information for ship
operations. Mobile satellite services also provide non-critical
communications and entertainment capability. The maritime sector
has integrated MSS into routine operations more than any other
sector, and thus has a larger cyber threat footprint.
The United States Coast Guard has responsibility for protecting
the nation’s maritime interests, port security, and licensing of
vessels and ships’ personnel. The Coast Guard formally recognized
the risks that cybersecurity challenges present to these missions in
2015 when it officially released its “Cyber Strategy” policy.141 As
articulated in the agency’s 2017 budget, by implementing this
strategy, the Coast Guard seeks to “coordinate cyber regulatory and
technical assistance activities across Federal, state and local
maritime industry stakeholders.”142 According to Lieutenant
Commander H. Lars McCarter, director of the Coast Guard Cyber
Operations Center, “[b]ecause the Coast Guard’s missions include
counterterrorism, anti-piracy, national security, and law
enforcement against criminal organizations, it and its stakeholders
potentially face greater danger of cyber-attack than other potential
U.S. targets.”143 Commander Nick Wong, charged with
implementing the industry portion of the cyber strategy, further
140

See 33 C.F.R. pt. 169 (describing requirements for long range tracking of
certain U.S. flagged vessels). Satellite AIS is one means of satisfying these
requirements.
141
J.R.
Wilson,
Cybersecurity
within
the
Coast
Guard,
DEFENSEMEDIANETWORK (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.defensemedianetwork
.com/stories/cybersecurity-within-the-coast-guard.
142
U.S. COAST GUARD, POSTURE STATEMENT, 2017 BUDGET IN BRIEF, 2015
PERFORMANCE
HIGHLIGHTS,
https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/
budget/2017_Budget_in_Brief.pdf.
143
Wilson, supra note 141.

OCT. 2018]Cybersecurity of Autonomous Systems in Transport

159

explains that the Coast Guard must address cyber threats originating
from equipment failure and operator errors as well as from nefarious
actors.144 For these reasons, he prefers the term, “cyber risk
management,” to describe the Coast Guard’s approach to maritime
industry cyber threats.145
According to Commander Wong, one key goal in the risk
management endeavor is clarifying what cyber threat activity the
maritime industry must report.146 Maritime operators already face
mandatory reporting requirements for marine casualties and
pollution and safety issues, and it is clear the Coast Guard wishes to
interpret its rule-making authority to encompass reporting of cyber
threats.147 The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
directed the Coast Guard and the maritime industry to develop
security plans for the protection of critical maritime infrastructure.148
Coast Guard regulations implementing this legislation now require
mobile offshore drilling units, cargo vessels greater than 100 gross
tons, tankers, and certain passenger vessels to keep records of and
report security breaches and incidents to the Department of
Homeland Security.149
In December of 2016, the Coast Guard issued policy guidance
specifically placing certain cybersecurity events within the scope of
security incidents that must be reported.150 The policy guidance
further directed that such incidents be reported to the Department of
Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center, thereby awarding operators the liability and
confidentiality protections previously identified above.151
Paragraphs 3(A)(ii), (iii), and 3(B)(vi) of the policy guidance details
144
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the metes and bounds of the cybersecurity events that do and do not
merit reporting as follows:
A. . . . .
ii . . . .
d) Intrusion into telecommunications equipment, computer, and
networked systems linked to security plan functions (e.g., access control,
cargo control, monitoring), unauthorized root or administrator access to
security and industrial control systems, successful phishing attempts or
malicious insider activity that could allow outside entities access to
internal IT systems that are linked to the MTS;
e) Instances of viruses, Trojan Horses, worms, zombies or other
malicious software that have a widespread impact or adversely affect one
or more on-site mission critical servers that are linked to security plan
functions; and/or
f) Any denial of service attacks that adversely affect or degrade access
to critical services that are linked to security plan functions.
iii. Note that routine spam, phishing attempts, and other nuisance events
that do not breach a system’s defenses are NOT BoS. Furthermore,
breaches of telecommunications equipment, computer, and networked
systems that clearly target business or administrative systems unrelated
to safe and secure maritime operations are outside the U.S. Coast
Guard’s jurisdiction . . . .
B. . . . .
vi. The Coast Guard recognizes that the cyber domain includes countless
malicious but low-level events that are normally addressed via standard
anti-virus programs and similar protocols. Operators should only report
events that are out of the ordinary in terms of sophistication, volume, or
other factors which, from the operator’s perspective, raise suspicions.152

Those same vessels subject to the aforementioned event
reporting requirements are required by regulation to conduct Vessel
Security Assessments153 and develop Vessel Security Plans.154 A
Vessel Security Assessment (VSA) is “an analysis that examines
and evaluates the vessel and its operations taking into account
possible threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and existing
protective measures, procedures and operations.”155 Rule 104.300
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(d) (11) specifically states that preparation of the assessment should
draw upon expertise in evaluating “[r]adio and telecommunications
systems, including computer systems and networks . . . .”156 The
existing regulation thus implicitly directs evaluation of
cybersecurity threats.
Additional security requirements specified by the rule contribute
to the mitigation of cyber threats. Specifically, the regulations
contain numerous provisions mandating personnel credentialing,
security training, and physical access controls to sensitive
locations.157 In addition, vessel operators must appoint a Chief
Security Officer, whose duties include completion of Vessel
Security Assessments and Plans, as well as periodic audits.158 One
maritime industry security expert estimates that these security
requirements will impact 10,300 U.S. Flag and SOLAS vessels and
about 70 foreign flagged and non-SOLAS vessels at a total cost of
$1.368B.159
The Coast Guard regulatory approach to cybersecurity focuses
not on equipment specifications, technical performance, or earth
station design. Rather, the holistic approach mirrors the risk
management approach of the NIST framework. The reach of the
regulations extends, however, only to the vessels and specific
surface operations under the Coast Guard’s jurisdiction, and hence
only to those operations over which the vessel owner/operator has
direct control. These regulations do not address potential risk
vectors arising from the integrity of the space segment, or from third
party suppression or corruption of valid message traffic.
C. Cybersecurity Regulation of AASD in the Aviation Sector
Similar to the maritime industry, all aviation regulation exists
within an overarching framework of international treaties and
understandings administered by an IGO, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). The FAA has primary responsibility
156
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for promulgating regulations that implement U.S. aviation treaty
obligations and ICAO agreements, and for exercising domestic
oversight of aviation activities. In contrast to the maritime domain,
which relies heavily on automation but has yet to experience
significant use of autonomous craft, existing FAA regulations
specifically address both manned and unmanned aircrafts.
1. FAA Regulation of Manned Aircraft Systems and Operations
Use of AASD in the aviation sector includes both discrete
systems and connected AASD. Like their maritime counterparts,
aircrafts flying over the high seas and in remote areas must use MSS.
AMSS services include: satellite communications with air traffic
control, private communications channels with airline operations,
internet and cellular services for passengers, data uplink and
downlink of passenger/customer service information and billing,
inflight entertainment data, data links for navigation and weather
information, and inflight uplink of aircraft telemetry to enhance
aircraft reliability. In the wake of the mysterious loss of Malaysian
Airlines Flight 370, aircraft on oceanic routes must include a means
of continuously broadcasting their position via AMSS/ADS-B out
by 2021.160 Over the landmass of the United States, connected
AASD can utilize cellular networks using repurposed bandwidth
originally set aside for mobile aeronautical communications.
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Figure 2: Aircraft Communications Networks and Services

Figure 3 diagrams typical data and telecommunications systems
and networks aboard a modern large aircraft per the DOT Volpe
Transportation Center.161 The ADN, or Aircraft Data Network,
denotes an industry consensus standard specification for aircraft
data network design promulgated by the Airlines Electronics
Engineering Committee, for example, ARINC 664. Although most
aircrafts place flight critical and non-flight critical services on
separate data networks, as Figure 3 shows, the DOT believes that
significant cyber security issues remain because of the potential for
interconnectivity of aircraft communications links.
The FAA regulatory approach differs fundamentally from that
taken by its sister transportation agencies. FAA regulations may be
broadly classed into the following types: those pertaining to
operations, those pertaining to certification of personnel, those
pertaining to airport facility design and security, and those
161
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pertaining to the certification of aircraft and aircraft software and
equipment. The FAA does not appear to have adopted the holistic
cybersecurity approach articulated by the Coast Guard in the
maritime domain. This statement does not mean the FAA is
insensitive to cybersecurity issues or that its regulatory structure
lacks similar elements. When compared to the maritime domain,
however, the aviation industry evolved in a way that places a greater
emphasis on the certification of the aircraft and component
subsystems.
The FAA grants various certifications that enable personnel,
equipment, and services to be introduced into the aviation
ecosystem. More specifically, the FAA issues:
(a) Licenses for pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and dispatchers; as
well as credentialing of certain key airport and other aviation
162
personnel,
(b) Production certificates and parts manufacturing authority for
163
airframe producers and spare and component parts manufacturers,
164

(c) Airworthiness certificates for aircraft,

(d) Operator certificates for airlines and certain other operations,
(e) Certification of airports and navigation equipment,

166

165

and

(f) Supplemental Type Certificates and Technical Standard Orders
which enable modification of an aircraft from its original configuration
167
by adding or removing equipment.

Several of the certification regulations specify precise
requirements or technical rules for issuance and compliance. For
example, twin engine aircraft certification rules require flight tests
that demonstrate the aircraft can take off on one engine and clear an
obstacle of a specified height.168 In many cases, however, the FAA
specifies certification requirements using industry consensus
162
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standards such as ARINC and RTCA.169 In addition, industry
consensus standards bodies such as the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE), the International Airline Transport Association
(IATA), and Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) play a significant
role in defining the design parameters and safety guidelines
underpinning the certification process. Although the FAA
incorporates and works cooperatively with consensus standards
bodies, the agency retains via testing and review a measure of
oversight to the acceptability and ultimate adoption of the resulting
standards.
Fundamentally, an aircraft does not go into service, nor a part
installed thereon, without technical review by the FAA via the
certification process. Of particular importance are the FAA’s
software design guidelines as documented in Advisory Circular AC
20-115D.170 This Advisory Circular cites an industry standard
published by the RTCA as DO-178C, and recognizes that standard
as an acceptable means, but not the only means, for establishing the
airworthiness (certification requirements) of AASD software. The
FAA classifies software according to the criticality of the function
it performs.171 Class A software includes flight control systems, the
failure of which results in catastrophic harm including possible
fatalities.172 Class D and E software includes non-flight safety
critical applications such as customer convenience internet
connections that, if compromised, have little or no safety effect.173
For each class of software, the Advisory Circular specifies a set of
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See, e.g., YANN-HANG LEE, ET AL., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF
TRANSP., DOT/FAA/AR-05/52, SAFETY AND CERTIFICATION APPROACHES FOR
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performance and fault tolerant objectives that must be met.174 At
higher levels of software classification the achievement of those
objectives must be independently verified by persons other than
those who coded the software.175
Despite the robust oversight afforded by the certification and software
design process, the interconnectivity of the aircraft AASD as shown in
Figure 3 still leaves it vulnerable to cyber-threats. In 2014 the FAA
responded by issuing policy guidance on the certification of aircraft and
equipment. That guidance states that connectivity to “nongovernmental” services not otherwise accredited for secure operations
may trigger additional certification steps.176 In particular, the FAA will
issue special conditions for the certification of aircraft or systems that
directly connect to external services and networks under the following
conditions: (a) The external service is non-governmental; (b) The aircraft
system receives information from the non-governmental service or
network; and (c) The failure effect classification of the aircraft system is
“major” or higher.177

AASD systems that only receive data from the aircraft and do
not transmit data to the aircraft are exempt from these provisions.178
The FAA explicitly states that this policy guidance does not
constitute additional regulation. Yet the FAA fails to provide
examples of special conditions or describe how the design of
impacted AASD will be evaluated.
The policy guidance as understood thus addresses at least those
AASD cyber-vulnerabilities arising from the receipt by the aircraft
of a corrupted signal or inaccurate data carried by such a signal. It is
less clear how well the guidance addresses the fault tolerance of
component equipment aboard the aircraft, or how resistant this
equipment should be to the introduction of malware.
Notably, the policy guidance leaves untouched existing FAA
Rules and Orders pertaining to field loadable software, digital
174
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Id.
176
SUSAN J. M. CABLER, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., PSAIR-21.16-02, ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL CONDITIONS FOR CYBER SECURITY
(2014),
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signatures and certificates for loadable software, FAA Order
8100.49 pertaining to design approval for software, and Spec 42
defining industry standards for digital information security.179 These
standards specify the fault tolerant and fail-safe design and
operating characteristics of software embedded within equipment,
according to the criticality of its function. Through these additional
mechanisms, the FAA mitigates the risk of improper operation of
aircraft equipment due to cyber malfeasance.
Despite the rigor of the certification process and the policy
guidance, those processes do not mitigate or anticipate all threats. In
November of 2016, the FAA received a report from the agency’s
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.180 That report, which
was not made public, is believed to have cited additional
cybersecurity concerns and to have recommended the partitioning
of onboard aircraft data networks into separate domains.181 For
example, noncritical networks such as in-flight entertainment,
would be implemented on a separate data network from the AMSS
data network used for communications with air traffic control.
Modern designs currently utilize this best practice, but regulations
do not mandate its use.
Threats from suppliers are not dealt with explicitly, other than
possibly via apart through a production certificate. For example,
software may be designed and certified in compliance with FAA
guidance, but testing may not reveal malware embedded by
suppliers and set to execute at a later date. The detection of such
unauthorized code depends on the robustness of the testing
protocols, and the manufacturer’s voluntary supplier qualifications
and oversight.
The FAA approaches the accreditation of aviation professionals
in a manner similar to that used by the Coast Guard in the maritime
domain. Personnel with the potential to impact aviation safety are
179

Id. at 1.
Woodrow Bellamy III, Senators Reintroduce Aircraft Cyber Security
Legislation, AVIONICS (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.aviationtoday.com/
2017/03/24/senators-reintroduce-aircraft-cyber-security-legislation/.
181
Id.
180

168

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 121

both vetted and acredited directly by the Agency or as part of the
certification requirements of their employer.182 In addition to the
FAA regulations governing the certification of pilots, mechanics,
dispatchers, flight attendants, and other key operations personnel,
FAA airport design criteria also mandate physical controls to limit
access to the airport and aircraft environment.183 These accreditation
regulations and controls provide the ancillary benefits of reducing
cyber threats by restricting physical access to vulnerable aircraft
systems and prescreening personnel working in the vicinity of
AASD once installed.
2. Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Operations
In the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Congress
mandated that the FAA safely and expediently integrate unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) into the national airspace system.184 In
response, the FAA defined three classes of UAS:
(a) unregulated hobbyist or recreational activities for aircraft weighing
less than fifty-five (55) pounds,185
(b) regulated commercial UAS operations for remote-piloted aircraft
weighing less than fifty-five pounds,186 and
(c) Section 333 exemptions required for unmanned aircraft fifty-five
pounds or greater, or for other deviations from any regulation governing
UAS and their operations.187

Only one of these aforementioned classes of UAS is truly
pertinent to cyber security concerns. Small, commercial UAS
operations under Part 107 or hobbyist activities must be conducted
with the aircraft in visual sight.188 Thus, other than utilization of GPS
182

See 14 C.F.R. pts. 60–68 (2018) (regarding Airmen); see also 14 C.F.R
§ 139.203 (citing certain personnel training, record keeping, and access controls
required for airport certification).
183
See 14 C.F.R. pt. 139, for airport certification requirements.
184
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat.
11 (2012).
185
14 C.F.R. §§ 101.41, .43.
186
14 C.F.R pt. 107.
187
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 333,
126 Stat. 11, 75–77.
188
14 C.F.R. § 107.31 (requiring the remote pilot in command or visual
observer to have the unmanned aircraft in visual sight at all times unless a waiver
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navigation services, such operations are unlikely to be consumers of
AMSS or otherwise coupled to a communications network.
Although their flight control systems are highly automated, the
hazards resulting from compromise of these aircraft are likely
benign. UAS operations conducted under Section 333 exemptions
or under a certificate of operation, however, may extend beyond
visual line of sight or be of such a size and scale that they do not
constitute a connected AASD as shown in Figure 4.189

Figure 3: Components of Connected UAS

While many larger UAS are operated as government aircraft
subject to special additional sensitivities and regulations beyond the
scope of this paper, several, civil, applications of such large UAS
presently exist. Private commercial UAS operations include: longduration scientific monitoring, land and crop surveys, pipeline and

is obtained). In addition, current UAS rely on line of sight radio communications
for aircraft control.
189
See SUSAN J. M. CABLER, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CYBERSECURITY &
MITIGATIONS
(2017),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/event_archive
/2017_uas_symposium/media/Workshop_2_Cybersecurity.pdf, for the image
Figure 4 is based upon.

170

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 121

powerline monitoring, and airborne communications relays.190
Future use of such systems will continue to expand to potentially
include the delivery of medicines and other goods, or the transport
of people.191 Therefore, the cybersecurity of their equipment and
operations presents a legitimate concern.
Like manned aircraft systems, both the unmanned aircrafts and
its operations must each comply with applicable regulations. For
large UAS, three pathways to aircraft certification exist. An
unmanned aircraft may receive type certification and a standard
airworthiness certificate just like any manned aircraft.192 The
unmanned aircraft can opt to receive a special airworthiness
certificate in the experimental category under 14 CFR § 21.191, if
the anticipated use involves research and development, crew
training, or market surveys.193

Figure 4: UAS Cyber-Vulnerability Overview
190

A Civil Future for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NASA (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.nasa.gov/aeroresearch/programs/iasp/uas/civil-future-for-uas.
191
See, e.g., KITTY HAWK, https://kittyhawk.aero/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2018)
(proposing a semi-autonomous personal aircraft and an air taxi).
192
14 C.F.R §§ 21.17(b), .25.
193
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PUBLIC GUIDANCE FOR PETITIONS FOR EXEMPTION
FILED UNDER SECTION 333 at 1 (2014) [hereinafter SECTION 333],
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition
/media/section333_public_guidance.pdf.
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The certification of both the aircraft and its onboard systems is
therefore similar to that described above for manned aircraft,
including the applicability of special conditions as mandated by PSAIR-21.16-02. However, the FAA acknowledges that the risk
calculus embedded within the regulations and policy guidance for
manned aircrafts may not scale appropriately for unmanned
aircrafts.194 Figure 5 illustrates the vulnerabilities of large UAS to
cyber-attacks and security deficiencies.
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, several potential risks exist when
the UAS relies on command signals or operation and critical data
received or provided via AMSS.195 As in the maritime and manned
aeronautical systems domains, these risks include jamming or
interference with the signal, corruption of the data embedded within
the signal, and corruption of the onboard systems which process
such signals. Each of these vulnerabilities could adversely impact
the aircraft’s ability to aviate, navigate, or communicate. In a
manned aircraft, however, a human pilot can directly observe and
intervene in aircraft operations with less data latency than a remote
pilot can. A human pilot may also possess a greater number of
options for directly controlling the aircraft, overriding autonomous
systems, or supplanting signal data with their own observations.
Conversely, in certain UAS operations, such as those occurring at
low level in remote or unpopulated areas, the consequences of such
vulnerabilities may not pose a hazard to life or property at all. For
these reasons, the FAA appears to implicitly acknowledge that the
risk exposure for UAS differ from manned aircraft and that cyber
risk policies appropriate for manned aircraft might not be
appropriate for UAS.196 Therefore, although aircraft and equipment
certification processes remain a valid mechanism for addressing
cyber-security issues within a UAS, management of cybersecurity
risks must place additional emphasis on mitigation practices during
flight operations.
194
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Civil operators of unmanned aircraft, not otherwise covered by
the small UAS operating rules of Part 107, must petition for a
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization197 or obtain a certificate of
operation to legally conduct operations.198 The requirements for
obtaining a certificate of operation are the same as those previously
discussed in connection with the regulations governing certification
of manned aircraft operations.199 Certification of Waiver and
Authorization constitutes ad-hoc applications for relief from certain
FAA regulations or airworthiness certification requirements.200
Thus, the precise content of these applications varies between
applicants and the operations they envision. A review of a sample
Section 333 Certificate of Authorization (COA) application reveals
that the applicant must describe the actions to be taken in the event
that communications links are lost either with the aircraft or between
the remote pilot, air traffic control, or members of the flight crew.201
The information requested by the sample application therefore
addresses the risks due to the jamming or complete loss of a
communications signal, but does not address the corruption of data
transmitted by such signal. Nor does the suggested application
specifically address the possibility that malware aboard the aircraft
might corrupt the processing of the received data, or cause the
transmission of the erroneous data. Unlike in the maritime domain,
there does not appear to be a formal discussion, requirement, or
emphasis on securing access to key aircraft systems once those
systems are approved as part of the aircraft certification.202
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FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 333,
126 Stat. 11, 75–77 (2012).
198
14 C.F.R. pts. 91, 135, 121. The author notes that some UAS proposals
include the transport of persons.
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SECTION 333, supra note 193, at 4.
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/media/FAA_UAS_Civil_COA_Request_v2.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).
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3. Proposed Legislation and Additional Rules
In May 2017, Senators Edward Markey and Richard Blumenthal
introduced legislation titled Cybersecurity Standards for Aircraft to
Improve Resilience Act of 2017 (aka. Cyber AIR Act). The Bill
requires that air carriers, aircraft manufacturers, and aircraft
equipment manufacturers disclose to the FAA any “attempted or
successful cyberattack” against any aircraft or ground support
system.203 Notably, the Bill does not address the potential liability of
such a disclosure, nor does the Bill mandate disclosure via the
Department of Homeland Security’s existing process. As previously
noted, the sharing of cyber-threat information among ecosystem
participants can be beneficial in defending the larger system against
attack. Industry participants, however, remain concerned that such
information could subject them to liability, regulatory sanction, or
the manipulations of an untrustworthy competitor.204 The Bill as
drafted is unlikely to illicit the support and cooperation of the
aviation community for these reasons.
The Bill additionally requires that all electronic entry points to
the aircraft or ground systems be hardened against cyber-attack and
that such measures be periodically evaluated for effectiveness, and
changes be made to such measures if warranted by the evaluation
results.205 Such a broad regulation may be too divorced from
tailoring the measure to the risk presented. For example, an
unmanned aircraft operating over the ocean waters of the United
States, may present no risk of harm even if compromised by a cyber
incident.
Finally, the Bill requires the FAA to work with the FCC, The
Department of Homeland Security, and The National Intelligence
Community to incorporate cybersecurity requirements into
requirements for an air carrier operating certificate or an aircraft
production certificate.206 As discussed above, existing FAA rules
203

Cybersecurity Standards for Aircraft to Improve Resilience Act of 2017, S.
679, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017).
204
See, e.g., COUNCIL V, FINAL REPORT 3, supra note 119; Eamon Javers,
Cyberattacks: Why Companies Keep Quiet, CNBC (Feb. 25, 2013, 1:45 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/id/100491610.
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focus predominately on certification of the aircraft and aircraft
subsystems, and on the aviation operations themselves. Certain FAA
rules, such as PS-AIR 21.16-02, do not rise to the level of formal
regulation. None of the FAA cybersecurity rules discussed pertain
to the operating certificate of the airline or the aircraft manufacturer.
Including such entities within the scope of the cyber regulatory
scheme would enable a more comprehensive approach along the
lines of that advocated by the Coast Guard in the maritime domain.
Such an approach would expand the focus of cybersecurity beyond
the physical realm of the aircraft and its systems to include risks
present in production and in the physical operating environment of
the aircraft. At present, the Bill has been introduced with no action
taken.207
D. Cybersecurity Regulation of AASD in the Automobile Industry
The regulation of cybersecurity for surface transportation
belongs to various constituent agencies within the U.S. Department
of Transportation.208 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Association
makes rules related to commercial vehicle operations “largely
focused on addressing human driver training, issues of human driver
fatigue, hours of service, rest and meal stops.”209 As such, this
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agency manages vehicle safety primarily through workplace rules
and human factors. One can therefore reasonably believe its
influence on the cybersecurity of vehicular transportation is
negligible at this time. The Federal Railroad Administration is
tasked with enforcing the nation’s railroad safety laws via rail safety
regulations.210 This agency only recently began surveying the
industry to better understand the future of AASD within the rail
system.211 The Federal Highway Administration conducts research
and promulgates regulations pertaining to highway design, traffic
control devices, and highway-related aspects of pedestrian safety.212
Although this agency concerns itself with the cybersecurity of the
roadway infrastructure, the agency largely works in cooperation
with its sister agency the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) in such efforts.213 The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration is the agency with responsibility for
all motor vehicle safety regardless of the degree of automation.214
Congress recognized the potential to create a jumble of
uncoordinated cybersecurity regulatory efforts within the surface
transportation sector. In March 2018, Congress passed legislation
directing the Department of Transportation to develop a
comprehensive plan to better manage initiatives pertaining to

guidance-could-be-issued-early-summer (quoting Steven Bradbury, DOT general
counsel); see 49 U.S.C. § 113 (2000).
210
49 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).
211
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deployment of such technologies.” William C. Vantuono, FRA RFI: “Automation
in the Railroad Industry,” RAILWAY AGE (Apr. 2, 2018),
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AASD.215 In response, the Department of Transportation published
its Comprehensive Management Plan for Automated Vehicle
Initiatives, and promised to issue in the later months of 2018 an
additional document titled: Preparing for the Future of
Transportation: Automated Vehicles 3.0.216 When developing this
latest document, the Department plans to build upon the policy and
regulatory approaches currently articulated in NHTSA Automated
Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety .217 Because of the degree
of economic activity surrounding autonomous cars, and the
influence the NHTSA exerts on current and future DOT
cybersecurity policy, this section focuses its analysis on the NHTSA
AASD regulatory scheme.
In its oversight of motor vehicle safety, the NHTSA employs a
combination of two regulatory tools: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (FMVSS) and recall of unsafe vehicles.218 In practice,
automobile manufacturers self-certify that they comply with the
FMVSS before placing an automobile into public use.219 The
NHTSA then randomly tests deployed vehicles to verify compliance
with the FMVSS.220 If tests reveal that a manufacturer’s vehicle is
noncompliant or presents a safety hazard, then the agency exercises
its authority to recall the vehicle.221 In actuality, the agency initiates

215
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few recall cases.222 The manufacturers self-initiate most recalls
before the agency needs to exercise its recall authority.223
To date, the agency has not issued any FMVSS regarding
cybersecurity.224 In 2017, the NHTSA published industry guidance
concerning the regulation of autonomous vehicles and vehicles
containing automated systems.225 That guidance specifically
eschews promulgation of formal regulations in favor of voluntary
compliance with 12 priority safety design elements.226
Safety design element 7 addresses cybersecurity matters.227 In its
guidance to industry, the agency “encourages,” but does not
mandate, certain practices.228 Specifically, NHTSA encourages
entities to design automation using “established best practices for
cyber vehicle physical systems,” including those established by
NIST, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of Global Automakers,
the Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and other
relevant agencies.229 The agency further encourages entities to
document their compliance with such standards as well as their
design choices in mitigating cyber risks.230 But notably, unlike the
Coast Guard’s approach, the agency does not require such actions—
even for systems that might impact safety of life. The agency only
advocates for submission of a voluntary safety self-assessment.231
Thus, the regulated entity has complete discretion over whether to
engage in any of these recommended behaviors—or not.
Also noteworthy is the distinction between the FAA’s regulatory
approach to aircraft and aviation systems and that taken by The
Department of Transportation its sister agency, NHTSA, with
222
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respect to surface vehicles. Although the FAA exercises its
oversight via mandatory regulation, policy guidance, and advisory
circulars; every aircraft, manned or unmanned, must either come
within a Rule exemption or meet certification standards and obtain
an airworthiness certificate prior to entering service.232 Individual
systems and pieces of equipment must also meet certification
standards either via a Technical Standards Order, or Supplemental
Type Certificate before being installed on an aircraft.233 The NHTSA
would, presumably, not permit a patently unsafe automated vehicle
from entering into service, but its exclusive reliance on its recall
authority is remarkable.
In the past, use of the recall authority coexisted with an
enforceable FMVSS. In the realm of cybersecurity, however, none
exist. The agency’s justification for its approach is therefore also
noteworthy. The NHTSA states that the purpose of the voluntary
guidance is: “to support the automotive industry, the States, and
other key stakeholders . . . .”234 Although safety is acknowledged in
passing as an agency responsibility, the Department of
Transportation’s voluntary guidance does not explicitly reference
the agency’s congressional mandate to provide “fast, safe, efficient,
and convenient transportation.”235 The agency’s other stated
objective vis a vis the public is to support public trust and confidence
in the safety of AASD by encouraging, but not requiring, the
regulated entities to disclose voluntary self-assessments and their
methodologies for achieving safety.236
The stated justification for this somewhat laissez faire approach
is to promote the introduction of potentially life-saving automation
while not impeding the innovation necessary to achieve it.237
Commenters have noted other possible benefits to this approach.
232
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Specifically, this approach allows for diverse responses to
cybersecurity threats and prevents the emergence of a cyber
monoculture where vulnerabilities are uniform across the system.238
Despite these potential advantages, the agency’s sole reliance on
voluntary compliance with consensus standards also has numerous
drawbacks. Voluntary industry standards, although advanced by
those with specialized technical expertise, leave no voice for the
consumer or the public in their formation. Additionally, in certain
technical fields, such as telecommunications, consensus standards
bodies have sometimes earned a reputation for being unwieldy
political entities capable of being captured and controlled by a savvy
player or one with a dominant intellectual property position239 Thus,
the technical solutions adopted by such groups may or may not be
the optimal approach to the problem addressed. Furthermore, merely
encouraging compliance with a standard is a far cry from requiring
that a device actually attains the performance achievable via that
standard.
No doubt in other sectors, such as aerospace, policy standards
bodies have successfully worked to advance common
understandings of technically appropriate solutions to shared
problems. The FAA has routinely turned to ARINC, the RTCA, the
SAE, and other standards bodies for solutions to stated problems.240
But, the FAA employs consensus standards in an entirely different
manner than NHSTA. The FAA utilizes consensus standards as an
acceptable means to demonstrate conformance with an existing
safety rule.241 This approach also enables the public to comment on
238
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the suitability of the standard since it forms a part of the agency’s
rule making activities.242
In the realm of motor vehicles, however, the NHTSA merely
encourages voluntary compliance with consensus standards in a
manner decoupled from any FMVSS, the agency’s rulemaking
process, or agency verification of compliance.243
Presumably, the consensus standards cited by the NHTSA could
also serve as a basis for establishing negligent design in product
liability cases. A failure to adhere to an acceptable consensus
standard may be grounds for establishing a negligent design unless
the automaker could document a rationale for the deviation. It is
noteworthy, however, that the NHTSA guidance strongly
discourages states from implementing their own regulations.244 The
NHTSA document states: “NHTSA strongly encourages States not
standards, promulgated by the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), were “an acceptable means, but not the only means” of demonstrating
compliance with 14 C.F.R. pt. 23. Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Publishes Means
to Comply with Part 23, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (June 11, 2018),
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=90566.
242
Accepted Means, supra note 241.
243
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(2016), ACTIVITIES, https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/omb/circulars_a119
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consensus standards in lieu of government unique standards and assessing private
sector conformance with voluntary standards). Section 4(a) defines a “voluntary
consensus standard” as one created using a development process having certain
defined attributes. A “voluntary consensus standard” is therefore to be
distinguished from “voluntary compliance with a standard.” The former term
describes the process by which the standard was created while the latter term
defines whether adherence to the standard bears any relation to regulatory
compliance. Although OMB Circular A-119 clearly articulates a government
policy favoring agency adoption of consensus standards in regulatory oversight
functions, the NHTSA use of standards differs significantly from that employed
by the FAA. The FAA uses voluntary consensus standards as an optional means
of demonstrating compliance with a Rule and in a manner clearly consistent with
the framework of OMB Circular A-119. The NHTSA merely encourages
voluntary adoption of voluntary consensus standards.
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to codify this Voluntary Guidance (that is, incorporate it into State
statutes) as a legal requirement for any phases of development,
testing or deployment of ADSs [Automated Driving Systems].”245
While acknowledging elsewhere that the regulation of liability
remains with the States, strict adherence to this admonition would
prevent states from formally incorporating the voluntary guidelines
and standards into any formal definition of defective design. Such a
prohibition would effectively gut the ability for product liability law
to serve as an incentive for the desired cyber-secure behaviors.
The totality of the NHTSA approach, especially when contrasted
with the regulatory approaches taken by other agencies, suggests a
regulatory body captured by the industry it is intended to regulate.
For perhaps this reason, or in response to the specific drawbacks
noted above, current legislation pending in Congress would make
the now voluntary self-assessment of compliance with these
standards compulsory while prohibiting the States from levying
additional design standards.246 In addition, each proposed bill
requires mandatory cybersecurity plans from automobile
manufacturers documenting their process for identifying and
mitigating vulnerabilities to cyber-attack.247 The regulatory scheme
advanced by the proposed legislation tracks the regulatory scheme
implemented by the Coast Guard in the maritime domain, and
appears to be a reasonable compromise to compel and ensure
automakers actually work through cybersecurity issues in a
245

Id. at 18.
See AV Start Act, S. 1885, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 3388, 115th Cong.
(2017) (requiring that manufacturers of highly automated vehicles develop written
cybersecurity and privacy plans for such vehicles prior to offering them for sale,
and also mandating that the Department of Transportation require safety
assessment certifications for the development of a highly automated vehicle or an
automated driving system). The proposed legislation also amends 49 U.S.C.
§ 30103 (b) to preempt any State laws or regulations regarding the design or
construction of automated vehicles.
247
Id. The proposed legislation is an attempt to amend Chapter 301, subtitle VI
of 49 U.S.C. by inserting a new section, § 30130 Cybersecurity of automated
driving
systems.
See
H.R.3388,
115th
Cong.
(2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3388/summary/00, for
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comprehensive way. In addition, this approach would ensure that
cyber failures potentially impacting safety of life are presented in a
manner over which the agency can exert its oversight authority prior
to the occurrence of an accident.
The voluntary guidelines advanced by NHTSA also address
disclosure of cyber incidents. Entities are encouraged to report to the
Automotive Information and Analysis Center, or other relevant
organizations, all discovered incidents, threats, exploits, and
vulnerabilities from internal testing, consumer reporting, or external
research.248 This private industry group, formed in 2015, established
a global information sharing community to track vehicle cybersecurity risks.249 According to the group’s web-pages, membership
encompasses over 99 percent of light-duty vehicles in North
America, with over 30 global original equipment manufacturers and
suppliers.250 Information submitted to this industry collaborative is
anonymized and shared with other members, a key component of
the collaborative architecture being the confidentiality of the
disclosing member.251 No government agency or law enforcement
organization has access to the submitted data without the approval
of the disclosing party, although the agency claims that it will work
cooperatively with the government on a need-to-know basis and
with the approval of the industry member.252 Presumably, the
information could be subpoenaed. Such a process is not only costly
and time consuming, but also implies that some aggrieved party has
already suffered a harm for which redress is sought.
The Department of Transportation therefore recognizes the
benefits that collaborative learning brings to the reduction of cyber
vulnerabilities, but has introduced a significant barrier to its own
edification of ongoing trends and developments. The data remains
entirely within the complete control of a private industry group with
no obligation to share its findings, observations or research with the
government. Unlike the system for critical infrastructure in use at
248
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DHS, the government possesses no mechanism that provides
visibility into emergent cyber-security issues or the effectiveness of
the aggregate industry response. Yet again, such disclosures are only
voluntary and not mandatory. As a result, the safety decision making
function has been completely ceded to the industry participants.
Unlike aviation, the driving public is left without any meaningful
independent arbiter of or enforcer of the necessary safety behaviors.
The significance of this position cannot be understated. Unlike
previous iterations of automotive automation, cyber compromise of
current AASD doesn’t just create consumer inconvenience, it
impacts safety of life.
E. Remote Sensing: NOAA Licensing and Operating Rules
The remote satellite sensing systems licensed by NOAA are
indirectly relevant to the regulation of AASD in the transportation
sector. AASD may consume processed data and services provided
by remote sensing technology but they currently do not directly
communicate with or process the raw data output from such
systems.253 Contemporary remote sensing systems downlink the
observed data back to a fixed base ground station for further data
processing and subsequent distribution to the end user or AASD.254
An examination of the cybersecurity regulations pertaining to
remote sensing systems is meritorious primarily as an investigation
into an alternative cybersecurity regulatory scheme, although
corruption of the remote observation data provided to the AASD is
also of concern.
Operators of commercial space-based remote sensing satellite
systems must obtain a license from the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration pursuant to the National and
Commercial Space Programs Act.255 Review of the specific license
253

The Use of Satellite Remote Sensing to Study the Human Dimensions of
Global Environmental Change, CIESIN, http://www.ciesin.org/TG/RS/RShome.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2018); The Technology of Satellite Remote
Sensing, CIESIN, http://www.ciesin.org/TG/RS/sattech.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2018).
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See supra note 253.
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51 U.S.C. §§ 60101–26 (2012).
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requirements documented in the corresponding regulations finds
cybersecurity addressed via two separate provisions.256 The first,
most directly applicable provision, mandates that all licensees
submit a “Data Protection Plan,” describing the licensee’s plan to
protect data and information through the entire cycle of tasking,
operations, processing, archiving and dissemination.257 “At a
minimum, this includes appropriate protection of communications
links and/or delivery methods for tasking of the satellite,
downloading of data to a ground station . . . , and delivery of data
from the satellite to the licensee’s central data storage facilities.”258
In 2008, NOAA published informal guidance in the form of a
“Licensee Data Protection Plan Template,” that outlines in greater
detail the types of information licensees should include in their
plans.259 Table 1 documents the key elements to be included.
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No. of Channels

Physical site
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Table 1: NOAA Data Protection Plan Template

Examination of the plan elements reveals that the anticipated
protection schemes address protections to ensure the proper
acquisition and dissemination of the data. Specific elements of the
plan pertaining to the performance and pointing characteristics of
spacecraft sensors address masking sensitive troop movements, and
complying with statutory obligations concerning sensing of Israel.260
Elements of the plan requiring encryption of data and control signals
not only protect against unauthorized collection of data, but also
seek to prevent against access to the data by unauthorized persons.

260

See 15 C.F.R. pt. 960, app. 1, § IV(4) (2018); Nat’l Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1064(a), 110 Stat. 2422, 2653
(“A department or agency of the United States may issue a license for the
collection or dissemination by a non-Federal entity of satellite imagery with
respect to Israel only if such imagery is no more detailed or precise than satellite
imagery of Israel that is available from commercial sources.”). The Department
of Commerce makes the determination as to the allowable level of precision. As
part of the licensing process, NOAA requires the applicant’s data plan to identify
how the proposed system will restrict the collection and dissemination of imagery
of Israel at the required resolution. See About the Licensing of Private Remote
Sensing Space Systems, NOAA CRSRA LICENSING, https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov
/CRSRA/licenseHome.html (last modified Jul. 27, 2018, 9:00:22 EDT).
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Absent from the plan, therefore, are any of the comprehensive,
NIST-like, analyses that identify and mitigate cyber-security risks
unrelated to data collection and use. For example, the plan template
and regulations neither suggest nor require controls of the suppliers
and services providers or any risk analysis of same. The plan
template neither suggests nor requires positive mitigation of risks
that the spacecraft could be damaged or lost due to the corruption of
onboard equipment. The plan template does not address the
possibility that an encrypted and correctly formatted control signal
might be received by the spacecraft that commands it to operate in
an undesired or even self-destructive way. The encryption of
transmitted packets, site access, and personnel security as required
by the plan do mitigate this risk, but these steps fail to account for
additional sources of risk. Specifically, the acquisition of ground
antennae and ground station operations by secondary suppliers
removes the owner/operators of the satellite from direct oversight of
certain operational aspects. The remote data service provider does
not appear to be required to mandate either by contract or other
means the protection of encryption keys or the appropriate access to
data as applicable. Review of some publicly searchable plans
indicates plan details do not reach this depth of holistic risk
assessment and mitigation.
Despite these apparent gaps in the data plan template, the second
of the two NOAA licensing regulations may indirectly address those
security items left unspecified by the template itself.261 Rule 960.11
requires that operators of remote sensing satellites maintain
operational control of the satellite from the United States at all
times.262 Operational control is defined to mean “the ability to
operate the system or override commands issued by any operations
center or station.”263 Wherein “[o]perate means to manage, run,
authorize, control, or otherwise affect the functioning of a remote
sensing space system, directly or through an affiliate or subsidiary.
This includes: (1) Commanding, controlling, tasking, and
261
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navigation of the system; or (2) Data acquisition, storage,
processing, and dissemination.”264 Additional licensing instructions
direct the applicant to describe those methods used to ensure the
integrity of operations including positive control of the space
system, operations centers, and ground stations.265 There appears
little more needed to establish this capability beyond the type of
information required by the data protection plan. This Rule,
however, may serve as an additional authority to strengthen license
requirements in response to the changing cybersecurity threat
environment.
Additional NOAA regulatory provisions bear upon
cybersecurity, although not directly. Licenses for commercial
remote systems are also subject to review by the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Interior,
and the Intelligence Community.266 These additional agencies may
review the licensing package for compliance with “international
obligations, foreign policy concerns, or national security
concerns.”267 Such reviews might flag additional cyber-security
issues; however, the scope of such reviews and their particulars
remain ambiguous.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Private law incentives to compel cyber-secure behaviors in the
transportation sector exist but are insufficient to achieve vigilance.
Unequal bargaining power and broad disclaimers of warranties and
liabilities limit meaningful negotiation over the allocation of cybersecurity risks via contact. Insurance, which could serve as a
mechanism to incentivize cybersecurity through oversight of risk
mitigation practices, typically excludes cyber-related incidents from
coverage. Hence, insurers do not exert much influence in promoting
cyber-secure design and best practices.
Product liability law remains a promising avenue for
incentivizing the manufacturers of AASD to engage in design and
264
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production behaviors that both reduces exposure to and mitigates the
consequences of cyber-security events. Product liability law is
maturing, but proving that the harm resulted from a faulty design or
failure to warn remains difficult and problematic. The formal
advocacy of adherence to voluntary consensus standards by some
agencies should be augmented by either:
(a) allowing those consensus standards with which an agency
encourages voluntary compliance to serve as admissible evidence of
competent design, a deviation from which can serve as a rebuttable
basis for product liability under state laws; and clearly stating use of
standards for this purpose is not federally preempted, or
(b) promulgating formal safety regulations that allow
conformance with the cited standard to serve as one mechanism for
compliance with the rule; and wherein failure to comply with the
formal regulation could then serve as a basis for product liability
under state laws.
Manufacturers and the providers of services are in the best
positions to anticipate, prevent, and mitigate the harms of cyber
malfeasance by others. Product liability law should therefore be
clarified and strengthened, perhaps at least through proposed
updates to the restatement.
Given the relatively weak ability of private law mechanisms to
incentivize cyber-secure behaviors, turning to public law solutions
such as legislation and regulation appears appropriate. Existing U.S.
regulations, however, are a jumble of varied approaches by different
oversight agencies. A review of the regulations pertinent to AASD
in the transportation sector reveals very different regulatory choices
among agencies in five key areas of cybersecurity oversight.
Table 2 compares the different approaches taken by each of the
relevant agencies. Close inspection of Table 2 exposes that one
entire segment of an interconnected AASD lacks any cybersecurity
regulatory oversight whatsoever. The absence of any FCC statutory
authority to exercise cybersecurity oversight means that there are no
compulsory behaviors related to the communications backbone of
any AASD. This omission is the most notable in the space
component of any satellite communications network. While other
agencies may lack the ability to regulate the communications
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network, they can, and often do, regulate the terrestrial end user
terminals and the processing of data provided by such networks.
Communications nodes and data sources in orbit however, are not
beyond the reach of hackers. Only new legislation can address this
key omission in oversight of the nation’s communication
infrastructure as a component of AASD.
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Table 2: Comparison of Regulatory Approaches in Five Key Areas of
Cybersecurity

The corollary to these observations also means that no single
agency will ever have a sufficient span of authority to manage
system and equipment cyber threats across all AASD network
segments. This fact indicates the desirability for some degree of
alignment and coordination of approaches across agencies.
Although the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast
Guard engage in efforts to share cybersecurity best practices and
strategies across federal agencies, such laudable work results only
in exchanges of information and cannot by itself ensure a synergistic
approach to cybersecurity regulation of AASD as a networked
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system of systems.268 Congress may wish to consider formally
directing such agency collaboration either via legislation or via
exercise of its oversight authority. Such actions would promote
coordinated and synergistic cybersecurity regulations without
unduly compromising continued innovation, or disregarding the
industry-specific nuances of the particular oversight agency.
Existing differences in regulatory approaches arise more from
regulatory legacy and less from industry-unique circumstances that
warrant these distinctions.
The needed and recommended additional steps, as outlined
below also recognize the need to distinguish between cyber risks
that potentially impact safety of life and those that do not. A
different level of safety oversight should be required of the former,
while the later, although not insignificant, can be developed with
less regulatory scrutiny. Specifically, as a result of the review and
analysis undertaken herein, the following legislative/regulatory
recommendations are made.
A. Legislation Regarding Disclosure of Cyber-security Events
Industry participants all articulate a need for mechanisms to
share cyber-threat events without fear of liability, regulatory
retaliation, or competitor abuse. Only certain limited subsets of the
AASD ecosystem, defined as “critical infrastructure,” can
participate in the Department of Homeland Security voluntary
268

See, e.g., Maureen D. Johnson, Department of Homeland Security Efforts:
Implementing Cybersecurity Initiatives Throughout the Federal Government, 71
COAST GUARD J. SAFETY & SECURITY SEA, PROC. MARINE SAFETY & SECURITY
COUNCIL, no. 4, Winter 2014–2015, at 52, https://homeport.uscg.mil/Lists/
Content/Attachments/1544/Proceedings.CyberSecurity.Vol71_No4_Wint2014.p
df (describing various efforts to share cybersecurity policies, information, and
best practices across multiple agencies); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF
TRANSP., TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLAN 15 (2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-transportationsystems-2015-508.pdf (suggesting, as a collaboration of federal agencies, broad
strategies for managing security, including cyber security, within the
transportation sector, articulating aspirational goals, and “encourage[ing] unity
of effort in cybersecurity initiatives and greater efficiency in evaluating cyber
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences”).
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programs for sharing such information inclusive of its statutory
liability protections.269 The definition of “critical infrastructure”
under the Homeland Security Act is too narrow to encompass all
transportation AASD activity of interest because that definition
concerns itself solely with items that, when compromised, have a
direct and debilitating impact on national security or public health.270
Therefore, as discussed previously above, while portions of the
aviation and maritime sectors come within the definition of “critical
infrastructure, “ this definition also operates to exclude significant
elements of the AASD communications backbone, the automobile
industry, and other AASD sub-elements that do not by themselves
directly bear on national security or public health. Industries and
AASD network components excluded from the definition of
“critical infrastructure” do not enjoy the cyber event disclosure
protections provided by § 214 of the Homeland Security Act.
The reluctance to share event data for fear of regulatory
retaliation, competitor abuse of the data, and production in
discovery therefore persists. The additional voluntary disclosure
process enabled by Presidential Directive PPD-41 does not
sufficiently address these concerns. Private industry voluntary
disclosure organizations are an additional and valuable alternative,
but do not necessarily provide the government with the
comprehensive “big picture” intelligence needed to protect the
country and make sound regulatory and legislative decisions. The
current reporting mechanisms therefore tend to under-report
incidents and retard the private sector’s responses and adaptations
to emerging threats.
Given the potential benefits to industry participants, the
insurance sector, and the public, a unified system for sharing cyber269

See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 214, § 116 Stat.
2135, 2152-55; 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2012).
270
See Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 2(4), § 116 Stat. 2140; 6 U.S.C. § 101(4); 42
U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012) (“‘[C]ritical infrastructure’ means systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.”).
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event data responsive to these concerns should be implemented.
Legitimate concern exists that blanket exemption from liability or
regulatory enforcement could lead to abuse of the disclosure system
as a means of avoiding accountability for avoidable harms. The
NASA aviation incident safety reporting mechanism is instructive
here. That system, in which aviation participants voluntarily
disclose safety-related incidents and mishaps within a specified time
interval, has been instrumental in spotting emerging safety concerns
and issuing timely alerts and recommended responses.271
The Department of Homeland Security Act should be amended
to either expand the definition of “critical infrastructure” to include
the components of AASD used in the transportation sector, or
optionally establish a mechanism whereby all participants wishing
to disclose cyber-security events can do so free of liability under
certain conditions. Under the second, more expansive option, the
disclosure system should be exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act, and it should be confidential and share information
with others only in an anonymized and aggregated manner unless
otherwise permitted by the disclosing party. Much like the NASA
aviation safety incident reporting, the party sharing information via
this mechanism should be shielded from regulatory repercussions
for the events disclosed under certain conditions. Candidate
provisions for a more expansive disclosure process might include
protection from regulatory repercussions and from disclosure of the
submitted material in a civil lawsuit, provided the following
conditions are true:
(a) The disclosed event did not result from the criminal or
willful negligence of the disclosing party,
(b) The disclosure documenting the event was submitted within
a specified time frame.
(c) The disclosing party has on file with the appropriate
regulatory agency, a comprehensive cyber-security risk mitigation

271

See Linda Connell, Address at the ATEC Safety Reporting Seminar in
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plan developed in accordance with relevant agency guidelines or a
consensus standard acceptable to the agency,
(d) The disclosure as submitted will not be produced in a civil
lawsuit alleging third party liability in cases where the event
disclosed did not result in the loss of life, serious bodily harm, or
permanent disability of a third party, and
(e) The disclosing party will be shielded from regulatory
repercussions even in cases involving the violation of any applicable
agency rule, so long as that violation was not willful or criminal, and
the disclosure was submitted within the specified time limit.
The unified disclosure mechanism outlined above would
encourage divulging cyber event information and would establish a
predictable set of rules consistent in all industry sectors. The
Department of Homeland Security is likely the best choice to
continue to serve as custodian of this information given their
existing mandate. Optionally, a third, non-regulatory agency or
private party could serve this function.
B. Mandatory Submission and Review of Cybersecurity Plans for
OEMs and Service Providers in the Transportation Sector
where Failure or Compromise of Products and Services Has
Potential Safety of Life or Critical Infrastructure
Consequences.
Only the maritime sector, via Coast Guard regulation, requires
entities to submit a comprehensive cyber-security plan.272 When
AASD cyber failures or attacks have the potential to impact safety
of life, this relinquishing of safety oversight cannot be justified.
Requiring submission of a comprehensive plan does not equate to
over-specifying the technology or mitigating actions to be taken
under such a plan. The agency, as in the case of the NHTSA, can
point to multiple sources of best practices for developing a plan, but
construction and filing of a plan should be mandatory in safety of
life relevant circumstances. Leaving plan development in the realm
of a voluntary activity means that there is no assurance that plans
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will even be developed, let alone that their quality is satisfactory, or
that the plan covers all appropriate threats.
The only reasonable alternative to the above position,
certification of manufacturers, and certification that parts and
equipment have been designed using acceptable best practices or
technical standards; imposes an even greater burden on industry. As
in aviation, this model may be the best path for assuring industry
achieves a minimum level of safety before putting a part or AASD
into commerce. The FAA has shown that it can retain its regulatory
oversight while industry remains free to promote and adopt
appropriate consensus standards regarding cybersecurity
certification requirements. When safety of life issues exist, deviation
from this general practice should not be the norm. In the case of selfdriving automobiles, the estimated savings in lives lost to traffic
accidents --by one account as many as tens of thousands each year—
may justify the expediency of substituting certification for another
type of compulsory approach.273 The NHSTA’s existing voluntary
approach puts the public in harm’s way. The NHSTA voluntary
approach abdicates the agency’s responsibility to safeguard
members of the public who reasonably are not knowledgeable or
sophisticated enough to perform this function in the marketplace.
Even with the FAA’s strong oversight activity, gaps in
cybersecurity oversight exist. With the possible exception of
operator and production certificates, the FAA does not require
submission of a comprehensive cybersecurity plan. Requiring such
plans of all participants whose AASD have possible safety-of-life
impacts if compromised would ensure those participants at least
identify and address cybersecurity risks.
C. Concluding Remarks
The recommendations made herein thus ensure critical segments
of any AASD are subject to cybersecurity oversight and that the key
elements of a cybersecurity regulatory scheme are in place across all
relevant agencies. The recommendations provided above do not
direct agencies to require the adoption of any specific technical
cybersecurity actions. Agencies remain free to define for themselves
273

See WATNEY & DRAFFIN, supra note 5, at 1–2.

OCT. 2018]Cybersecurity of Autonomous Systems in Transport

195

or otherwise establish independent sources of cybersecurity best
practices. The recommended approach thus also avoids calcification
around a fixed set of remediations and enables a diversity of
solutions to continuously evolve. By following these
recommendations, industry participants can therefore remain nimble
in the face of evolving cyber threats, while ensuring public safety
through what proves to be needed regulatory oversight.
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF FCC REGULATIONS RELATING TO
LICENSING AND OPERATION OF MSS

Table A-1: MSS Earth Station Licensing Requirements
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Table A-2: MSS Space Station Licensing Requirements
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